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[T]his case presents novel issues of fundamental 
importance that should not be resolved by mechanical 
reliance on legal doctrine. 
-Superintendent v. Saikewicz1 
The state has an interest in "maintaining the ethical integrity 
of the medical profession."2 The U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized this proposition in its recent landmark "assisted 
suicide" decision, Washington v. Glucksberg.3 Unfortunately, the 
Court did so in a way that could undermine the ethical 
integrity of the medical profession in. this country, in cases 
ranging from the right to refuse treatment to assisted suicide, 
abortion, and the death penalty. 
As discussed in this Article, the interest in the ethical 
integrity of the medical profession (EIMP for short) has been 
widely recognized by courts. These courts typically have done 
so in difficult cases at the margins of medical practice, where 
the powerful themes of death, ethics, and the powers of the 
state intersect. EIMP is a reasonable goal, and most citizens 
would probably agree that there is a state interest in ensuring 
that doctors maintain high standards of ethical conduct. Stated 
in that form (as what I will call the Societal Goal), EIMP is 
vitally important, and this Article discusses ways in which our 
courts and society at large can take steps to ensure it. But is 
this what the courts mean by EIMP? And how are states and 
courts supposed to maintain EIMP? Surprisingly, there are no 
clear answers to these questions; none of the dozens of 
jurisdictions that have asserted a state interest in EIMP have 
ever really explained what EIMP means or what would protect 
it. 
What makes this ironic is that, as a result, EIMP - in the 
sense defined in the last paragraph - has not been maintained 
1. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 422 
(Mass. 1977) [hereinafter Saikewicz). . 
2 /d. at425. 
3. 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (liThe state also has an interest in protecting the 
integrity and ethics of the medical profession."). 
HeinOnline -- 23 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 489 1999-2000
No.2] Death, Ethics, and the State 489 
but rather has been threatened by these court decisions, 
regardless of their outcome. Instead of explaining what EIMP 
means, courts simply have cited earlier cases asserting a state 
interest in EIMP. The cited cases themselves do the same thing. 
The trail ultimately leads back to the landmark right-to-die case 
of Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz. 
However, the court in that case (whose self-conscious judicial 
activism was quoted above) simply made EIMP up out of 
whole cloth. 
And so it goes. Judges make things up and their successors 
cite them blindly, even in cases involving the most serious 
matters of life and death. With EIMP, this combination of 
improvisation and mimicry has the effect of twisting courts' 
words until they achieve the opposite of what they say. The 
result-degrading doctors' standards of ethical conduct-is 
very dangerous indeed. This Article is an attempt to shine a 
light on this line of case law, and to suggest new and more 
effective ways to ensure that we as a society maintain high 
standards of medical ethics. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The story of EIMP begins in 1977 with Superintendent v. 
Saikewicz,4 the Massachusetts 'right to refuse treatment' case 
that introduced EIMP· as part of a state-interest calculus. 
Despite the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's warning, 
quoted above, against /I mechanical reliance on legal doctrine," 
many courts facing treatment-refusal and other life-and-death 
issues have blindly adopted the Saikewicz state-interest 
formula, including EIMP. Eventually, EIMP's path led to the 
Supreme Court in Glucksberg. 
This Article has three themes. I first examine the origins, 
application, and consequences of the EIMP standard. 
Ironically, I contend, the articulation of a state interest in 
maintaining the /I ethical integrity of the medical profession" 
has served to undermine the medical profession's ethical 
integrity.s 
4. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977). 
5. The question of one's right to die is a complex and emotional one, and has 
already been discussed extensively in the literature. Therefore, I do not focus on 
the extent to which patients have the right to forge their own destinies. Instead, I 
explore, among other things, the ways in which Americans and their judges might 
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The second theme of this Article, subtler but just as 
important, is the tendency of courts to 'mechanically rely on 
legal doctrine' rather than carefully scrutinize sources and their 
applicability.6 As this Article traces the spread of EIMP into 
other jurisdictions as well as into other areas of law, the 
background of the analysis reveals how a single act of judicial 
activism (or judicial creativity, depending on one's point of 
view) can mushroom, distorting (or informing) an entire area 
of case law for decades. 
The third theme, also subtle but significant, concerns courts' 
use of multi-factor balancing tests. When a factor like EIMP is 
part of a balancing test that includes weighty interests such as 
privacy and life, EIMP can easily get lost in the shuffle. Also, 
factors placed on the losing side of the balance are often 
ignored in making policy determinations when courts 
conceptualize justice as "scales." A better solution, I argue, is 
to attempt to maximize the sum of all relevant interests, what 
we might call "Justice as Optimizer." 
Part IT is a brief prologue, examining the Saikewicz case at its 
origins-the probate court-and highlighting the ironically 
questionable ethics of the doctors, lawyers, and judge in the 
case. This examination provides the background for Part lIT, 
where I take a detailed look at the murky origins of the ethical 
integrity standard in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court's Saikewicz decision. In Part IV, I chronicle EIMP's 
application in dozens of death cases7 in the two decades since 
Saikewicz. In Part V, I examine the use of the standard and its 
analogues in the areas of abortion, assisted suicide, and the 
death penalty. Part VI is devoted to analyzing the Supreme 
Court's decision in Glucksberg, in the context of the rest of this 
make such choices in ways that more effectively safeguard medical ethical 
integrity. 
6. Conventional theories of jurisprudence tend to describe judicial decision-
making as either "realist" and ad hoc, or "formalist" and rule-based. Neither 
model really explains the case of EIMP, in which a "rule" is recited blindly (thus 
not realist), but it is never defined and is often ignored (thus not formalist). 
Obviously, this characterization is based on gross simplification of the formalist 
and realist camps. See generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE (1995) (providing detailed and nuanced analysis of these 
competing themes). A full treatment of EIMP in the context of various theories of 
jurisprudence is a project for another day. 
7. I use the term "death cases" as a catch-all for "right to refuse treatment" 
cases, including patients with curable and incurable, treatable and untreatable, 
and terminal and non-terminaI diseases. 
HeinOnline -- 23 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 491 1999-2000
No.2] Death, Ethics, and the State 491 
Article. In Part VII, I conclude with some proposed solutions 
to the outlined problems with EIMP and the judicial decision-
making process. I will argue that EIMP should embody what I 
call the "Societal Goal," meaning it is important that we, as a 
society, guarantee that our doctors maintain high standards of 
ethical conduct, in part by ensuring broader societal input into 
defining what" ethical conduct" entails. 
II. SAlKEWICZIN THE PROBATE COURT - ETHICAL INTEGRITY 
PROLOGUE 
On April 19, 1976, Joseph Saikewicz was diagnosed with 
acute myeloblastic monocytic leUkemia.s Saikewicz's 
prognosis was for a relatively painless death, in a few months 
at the most. An alternative was for Saikewicz to undergo 
difficult and uncomfortable treatments of chemotherapy, 
which had a 30 to 50 percent chance of success (probably closer 
to the lower bound, given Saikewicz's age of Sixty-seven). 
"Success" meant remission, which could last two to thirteen 
months, after which Saikewicz's leukemia would likely return. 
However, as the probate judge in Saikewicz's case found, the 
majority of people in Saikewicz's situation would have elected 
to receive chemotherapy. Nonetheless, on the urging of 
medical experts and Saikewicz's guardian ad litem, the probate 
court ordered that no treatment be administered to Saikewicz 
for his leukemia. 
It was left to a probate judge to make this treatment 
determination because Saikewicz had an I.Q. of 10. He was 
unable to communicate, and he most likely did not understand 
his condition well enough to give anything resembling 
informed consent. 
A. Why Mr. Saikewicz's Life Was Not Prolonged 
The decision apparently turned on Mr. Saikewicz's mental 
deficiency. Two excerpts from the probate court transcript 
show that the decision was a close one:. 
TIm COURT: .... I feel that if I had a serious disease and 
with treatment I could live another five or eight years or ten 
years, whatever, 1'd rather take ~e treatment than just take 
8. The facts of the case presented here, unless otherwise cited, can be found in 
the appellate decision (Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 419-22). 
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the chance of dying tomorrow or next week. 
MR. MELNICK [the guardian ad litem]: Let me say this, 
that that was my opinion, but ... I was informed that the 
toxic effects from the treatment would be so great and with 
his inability to understand the pain, the chances of success 
are small to begin with, and he'd die comfortably if he didn't 
have any treatment. Your judgment is yours and mine is 
mine, but the toxic effects of the drugs would be very great 
in my mind. That is how I made my judgment, but I agree 
that a person that could make an informed consent would 
consent to it.9 
Regardless of the fact that "a person that could make an 
informed consent would consent to it," the fact that 
chemotherapy would be painful and confusing to Mr. 
Saikewicz convinced the guardian ad litem that it was better to 
let him die painlessly. 
The judge was not so sure: 
TIIE COURT: That is the choice I have to make. 
DR. DAVIS: That is it. I don't know. I don't have that deep 
knowledge. 
TIIE COURT: I am inclined to give treatment. 
DR. JONES: One thing that concerns me is the question 
about his ability to cooperate. I think it's been made clear 
that he doesn't have the capability to understand the 
treatment and he mayor may not be cooperative, therefore 
greatly complicating the treatment process .... 
TIIE COURT: Dr. Davis, do you agree? 
DR. DAVIS: I think it's going to be virtually impossible to 
carry out the treatment in the proper way without having 
problems. You have to see him. When you approach him in 
the hospital, he flails at you and there is no way of 
communicating with him and he is quite strong; so he will 
have to be restrained and that increases the chances of 
pneumonia, to restrain him if he can't be up and around. 
9. Appendix at 40, Saikewicz (No. 711) (Transcript, Hampshire, ss. Probate Court 
Proceeding before Jekanowski, J., In re Saikewicz, No. 45596, May 13, 1976). 
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TIlE COURT: Maybe I should change my judgment.10 
The judge did change his judgment, and agreed to let the 
doctors withhold treatment from Mr. Saikewicz: 
TIlE COURT: Do I have to form a written judgment? 
MR. ROGERS: Yes, I will draft it. 
TIlE COURT: After a full hearing with medical specialists 
and doctors being present and their testimony being taken, 
the Court determines and adjudges that chemotherapy 
treatment should not be given at this time,u 
The court's findings, apparently written by Mr. Rogers, the 
staff attorney at the hospital, are worth quoting here at length: 
2. That said JOSEPH SAIKEWICZ is 67 years of age and is 
currently suffering from acute myeloblastic monocetic [sic] 
leukemia. 
3. That the only available medical treatment therefor is the 
administration of various drugs, known as II chemotherapyll. 
4. That said JOSEPH SAIKEWICZ is profoundly retarded, 
with an I[.]Q. of 10 and a mental age of approximately 2 
years and 8 months, and is unable to give informed consent 
to such chemotherapy. 
5. That the majority of persons suffering from leukemia ... 
choose to receive treatment in spite of its toxic side effects 
and risks of failure. 
13. That factors weighing against administering 
chemotherapy for said JOSEPH SAIKEWICZ are: (1) his 
age, (2) his inability to cooperate with the treatment, (3) 
probable adverse side effects of the treatment, (4) low chance 
[30-40 percent] of producing remission, (5) the certainty that 
treatment will cause immediate suffering, and (6) the quality 
of life possible for him even if the treatment does bring 
about remission. 
14. That factors favoring administration of chemotherapy 
for said JOSEPH SAIKEWICZ are: (1) the chance that his life 
10. [d. at 43-45. 
11. [d. at 45. 
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may be lengthened thereby, and (2) the fact that most people 
in his situation when rven a chance to do so elect to take the 
gamble of treatment? 
Note that of all of the "con" factors, all but two seem to be 
canceled out by the second "pro" factor (i.e., that most people 
who could consent to the chemotherapy would do so). 
Regardless of whether "most people in [Mr. Saikewicz's] 
situation" would have been acting rationally in choosing to 
receive chemotherapy - despite their age and the pitfalls of 
treatment.:....it is nonetheless the choice that they would have 
made, and a choice that would have been obeyed. The decision 
to treat Mr. Saikewicz differently from "most people" therefore 
must have turned on other considerations. The only remaining 
II con" factors - presumably, then, the dispositive ones - are the 
second and the sixth: that Mr. Saikewicz could not cooperate 
with the treatment, and that he would have a poor quality of 
life even if the. treatment brought about remission. 
In the abstract, cooperation 'would seem to be a valid issue. 
One must wonder, though, if there really was no way to treat 
Mr. SaikeWicz through sedating him or through making an 
intensive effort to calm himP Certainly, no one asked that 
question. Perhaps it was not worth the effort, perhaps it would 
not have worked, but one wonders why the issue was not even 
raised by the court. The answer cannot be that it would 
somehow be unethical to sedate Mr. Saikewicz in order to lull 
him into cooperating with a treatment to which he could not 
consent-the whole purpose of this proceeding was to make 
Mr. Saikewicz's decision for him, to decide what was best for 
him notwithstanding his own reactions. 
The best explanations that the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court ("SJC") could muster when validating the 
probate court's use of the cooperation issue were the following: 
The possibility that such a naturally uncooperative patient 
would have to be physically restrained to allow the slow 
intravenous administration of drugs could only compound 
his pain and fear, as well as possibly jeopardize the ability of 
12 Id. at 47-48 (Order of Jekanowski, J., Hampshire, ss. Probate Court, In re 
Saikewicz, No. 45596, May 13, 1976). 
13. This question is explored in detail in ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF 
STRANGERS: THERULEoF~WINDocroR-PATIENTRELATIONS 157-58 (1979). 
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his body to withstand the toxic effects of the drugS.14 
The first explanation is unconvincing, as it suggests that 
sedating Mr. Saikewicz would have been, on balance, both 
difficult and painful. The second explanation is purely 
speculative. Notwithstanding these flaws, cooperation remains 
more convincing than any other factor proffered to support the 
decision to withhold treatment. 
More troubling is the probate court's other main reason for 
withholding treatment: Mr. Saikewicz's diminished quality of 
life. The appellate court struggled to interpret this as a 
reference to the pains of chemotherapy)' saying: 
The sixth factor identified by the judge as weighing against 
chemotherapy was "the quality of life possible for him even 
if the treatment does bring about remission." To the extent 
that this formulation equates the value of life with any 
measure of the quality of life, we firmly reject it. . .. Rather 
than reading the judge's formulation in a manner that 
demeans the value of the life of one who is mentally 
retarded, the vague, and perhaps ill-chosen, term" quality of 
life" should be understood as a reference to the continuing 
state of pain and disorientation precipitated by the 
chemotherapy treatment.IS 
This statement by the SJC is a bald-faced lie, albeit a creative 
one. It reads like a stinging rebuke to the probate judge, nicely 
veiled to say "you must have meant X, because you couldn't 
have meant Y." However, the probate judge meant exactly 
what the SJC firmly rejected as demeaning. The SJC had to 
know this-the probate judge could not have equated "quality 
of life" with the pain and disorientation of chemotherapy as the 
Supreme Judicial Court did, because the probate judge had 
already mentioned the latter in his third and fifth "con" factors 
(high probability of side effects and certainty of pain and 
suffering respectively).16 
14. Saikewicz,370 N.E.2d at 432. 
15. ld.; see a/so BURT, supra note 13, at 158. 
16. Possibly, the probate judge also devalued Mr. Saikewicz's life because of his 
age, which was one of the reasons given for not proceeding with the 
chemotherapy. The SJC stated that age is "of course" immaterial to calculations of 
the value or quality of life and that it was only mentioned as a factor because Mr. 
Saikewicz's age lowered the probability of success of the treatment. Saikewicz,370 
N.E.2d at 432 n.17. This rationale would be redundant, though, given that the low 
probability of success is already mentioned as a "con" factor. Indeed, the 
prospect of success becomes dim only when one adds in the age factor (if then). 
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The SIC, then, had to recognize the deeply flawed basis of 
the probate court decision. It chose to ignore this fact and to 
rewrite the decision on what it perceived to be stronger 
ground. Regardless of the S]C's approach, it affirmed the 
probate court's decision, which allowed Mr. Saikewicz to die 
because he did not merit the same treatment that a competent 
person would choose. The court's opinion thus suggests that 
the life of an old retarded person is less worthy of protection 
than that of an ordinary person with the same condition. 
This is an ethically troubling decision. The judge was 
responsible for it, but the doctors encouraged and supported 
him. Left to his own devices, the judge apparently would have 
ordered treatment. The decision here, if unethical, reflects as 
much on the medical profession as the judiciary. 
B. Who Decides? 
Professor Robert Burt raises the question of "who decided" 
Mr. Saikewicz's fate in the course of making a larger point 
about the unwillingness of the parties in such situations to 
enter into a "direct struggle";17 i.e., to interact with a dying 
person: 
Most fundamentally, this . . . reflected everyone's un-
willingness to enter into sustained interaction with Joseph 
Saikewicz . . .. The trial transcript shows this if we attempt 
to identify from it precisely who decided to withhold treatment 
from Saikewicz-the doctor or the judge. The judge claimed 
power to decide, to which the doctor deferred on the ground 
that he lacked "that deep knowledge" -until the judge 
suggested that his decision would require the doctor to treat. 
The doctor then objected. . .. The judge had thus succeeded 
in obtaining a highly explicit recommendation from the 
doctor and then encircled his decision with the rhetorical 
flourishes "after a full hearing with medical specialists and 
doctors being present and their testimony being taken, the 
Court determines and adjudges .... " Who then was 
responsible for this decision?18 
At the appellate level, this question was answered decisively, 
once again in a way that rewrites the basis of the lower court's 
decision: 
17. BURT, supra note 13, at 155,157. 
18. [d. at 157 -58 (emphasis added). 
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[S]uch questions of life and death seem to us to require the 
process of detached but passionate investigation and 
decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of 
government was created. Achieving this ideal is our 
responsibility and that of the lower court, and is not to be 
entrusted to any other group purporting to represent "the 
morality and conscience of our society/' no matter how 
highly motivated or impressively constituted.19 
497 
Were it not for the vacillations of the probate judge; for the fact 
that the doctors testifying before him seemed to be leading him 
by the nose; for the fact that the doctors' lawyer wrote the 
opinioni20 for the fact that the probate judge pulled an 
existential punch by deciding not that Joseph Saikewicz would 
not receive treatment, but only that he should noti were it not 
for all of these things (none of which are visible in the appellate 
decision), this declaration by the SJC would be inspiring 
instead of ironic. 
Some irony would remain. The SJC said in Saikewicz that 
judges, not doctors (or the legislature) should make life and 
death decisions. This idea comports with the notion that the 
state has its own interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of 
the medical profession, rather than leaving doctors to their own 
ethical devices. It clashes, however, with subsequent courts' 
treatment of the ethical integrity standard, which has generally 
entailed passively deferring to the medical establishment. 
Twenty-four years later, the case of Joseph Saikewicz seems 
an odd vehicle for positively asserting, and supposedly 
vindicating, a state interest in maintaining the ethical integrity 
of the medical profession. When they treated Joseph Saikewicz 
differently because of his mental incapacity - by withholding 
treatment that competent patients in his condition would 
choose to receive-the doctors in this case arguably 
compromised their ethical integrity. In a sense, then, Saikewicz 
is an appropriate place from which to consider EIMP as a 
cautionary example, not as a positive archetype. 
Unfortunately, the SJC used it as the latter, and over the next 
twenty years, judges in much of the rest of the country 
followed suit in applying the appellate decision. 
19. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 435. 
20. This practice is not unusual, to be sure, but in this case it further dramatizes 
this judge's failure to exert control. 
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ill. ORIGINS 
The origins of EIMP in the death cases are murky. The 
Saikewicz case supposedly synthesized the standard from 
previous cases, but upon closer analysis we can see that it 
transformed and expanded the interest far beyond anything 
that had appeared before. To put it bluntly, the SJC made up 
EIMP, the same way it constructed a falsely ethical version of 
the probate court's decision. Compounding these problems, it 
made little effort to explain coherently what the EIMP standard 
was supposed to mean. Part ill suggests that these chaotic 
origins are reflected in the lack of respect and the inconsistent 
treatment the Saikewicz standard has received. In other words, 
the carelessness with which the state interest in the ethical 
integrity of the medical profession was first asserted has led to 
its subsequent undermining. 
A. Forerunners 
Long before Saikewicz used it, the phrase" ethical integrity of 
the medical profession"21 appeared in a series of pharmacy 
cases. An early and typical example is Stadnik v. Shells City, 
Inc.,22 a 1962 case that struck down a law preventing 
pharmacies from advertising prescription prices. The ban had 
been intended to prevent doctors from deciding which drugs to 
prescribe based on price, but the court asserted that the ethical 
integrity of the medical profession could be relied upon to 
nullify any such market pressure.23 Several cases in the 1960s 
and 1970s used comparable language in dealing with similar 
pharmacy advertising bans.24 Before Saikewicz, then, the main 
use of EIMP language was to express confidence that doctors 
were motivated by science and ethics, not economic 
considerations. 
Two other cases, closer to Saikewicz both in time and topic, 
21. I use the term EIMP to cover similar phrases that appear in the case law, 
such as "ethical integrity of medical practice," and "integrity of medical ethics." 
22. 140 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1962). 
23. See id. at 875. 
24. See, e.g., Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. 
Cal. 1975); Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-a-Lot, Inc., 311 A.2d 242, 250 (Md. 
1973); Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Sills, 225 A.2d 728 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1966); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 272 A.2d 487, 492-93 (pa. 
1971); Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Gibson's Discount Ctr., Inc., 541 S.W.2d 884, 
887-88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). 
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also referred to the ethical integrity of the medical profession. 
Like the prescription cases, they ruled that states' external 
attempts to regulate doctors were unwarranted given the 
profession's strong internal ethical integrity. In Poe v. 
Menghini,25 an important pre-Roe v. Wade abortion case, a 
federal court deemed unnecessary a state's requirement that a 
three-doctor panel pre-approve abortions. One reason given 
was that the state interest in preserving the life of the unborn 
child could be served simply by relying on lithe self-discipline 
and professional ethics and integrity of the medical professionll 
reflected in the judgment of the one doctor treating the 
patient.26 
The second example was the trial court decision in the 
famous case of Karen Quinlan.27 In holding that Ms. Quinlan 
should not be taken off of life support, the trial court argued 
that: 
The judicial conscience and morality involved in considering 
whether the court should authorize Karen Quinlan's 
removal from the respirator are inextricably involved with 
the nature of medical science and the role of the physician in 
our society and his duty to his patient. 
When a doctor takes a case there is imposed upon him ... a 
higher standard, a higher duty, that encompasses the 
uniqueness of human life, the integrity of the medical 
profession and the attitude of society toward the physician, 
and therefore the moral~ of society. A patient ... [expects] 
that he (the physician) will do everything in his power, 
everything that is known to modern medicine, to protect the 
patient's life. He will do all within his human power to 
favor life against death. 
The nature, extent and duration of care by societal standards 
is the responsibi1~ty of a physician. The morality and 
conscience of our society places this responsibility in the 
hands of the physician. What justification is there to remove 
it from the control of the medical profession and place it in 
the hands of the courtS?28 
25. 339 F. Supp. 986 (D. Kan, 1972). 
26. ld. at 995. 
27. In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), modified, 355 A.2d 
647 (N.J. 1976). . 
28. ld. at 818 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). One commentator sums up 
this part of the trial court's decision in this way: 
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This decision displays a subtle difference from the pharmacy 
cases and Poe. As in the previous cases, the Quinlan trial court 
said that the medical profession was a better guardian of 
medical-ethical standards than the state. However, where the 
other cases had placed such confidence in individual doctors 
and their "self-discipline," the trial court in Quinlan spoke of 
ethics as if they were an external duty "imposed" on doctors 
simply by their membership in the medical profession.29 
The New Jersey Supreme Court continued this trend toward 
viewing ethics at a professional rather than individual level in 
the appellate Quinlan decision.3D The excerpt from the lower 
court opinion quoted above was included almost verbatim in 
the appellate decision, but, significantly, the language about 
the integrity of the medical profession was neatly excised. The 
supreme court rejected the lower court's notion that doctors, 
not the courts, should decide the fate of patients like Ms. 
Quinlan.31 The court held that the lower court could 
reasonably defer to Quinlan's doctor's pro-life decision,32 but it 
articulated a new standard to be applied to future cases. 
Henceforth, it said, hospital ethics committees should decide 
what to do with such patients. Such committees could screen 
out the self-interested motives of patients' families and, 
importantly, of doctors.33 Despite such deference to ethical 
boards, the court gave Quinlan's hospital a specific criterion on 
which to base its decision.34 Regardless of whether a court or a 
hospital committee decided what was ethically acceptable, 
individual doctors no longer received the same level of 
deference as in previous cases. 
The bial court judge said he could not order the ventilator removed 
because no doctor was willing to testify that it was consistent with 
medical ethics to take Karen off of the ventilator. This was shocking 
because ventilator removal was consistent with medical ethics, even 
though the physicians would not say it in public. 
George J. Annas, Facilitating Choice: Judging the Physician's Role in Abortion and 
Suicide, 1 QUINNIPIACHEAL1HL.J. 93, 97-98 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
29. Quinlan, 348 A.2d at 818. 
30. See 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
31. See id. at 665. 
32 See id. at 666. 
33. See id. at 669. 
34. This criterion reflected the court's strong holding recognizing a p'rivacy-
linked right to die for people in Quinlan's condition. See id. at 671 ("If that 
consultative body agrees that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever 
emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient slale, the 
present life-support system may be withdrawn .... " (emphasis added». 
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Perhaps this result reflected the waning of America's former 
deification of doctors. The god-like status of doctors has fallen 
in the past few decades at the same time, paradoxically, as 
doctors' powers to sustain life have increased. When doctors 
were less able to prevent our deaths, they were revered.35 Now 
they can sustain life beyond our wildest former expectations, 
but once patients realize the hollowness of such mechanical 
life, those patients who want to die sue their doctors. 
Alternatively, perhaps the court's decision reflected the higher 
stakes and publicity of Quinlan. At a minimum, it 
foreshadowed the approach in Saikewicz and Glucksberg of 
taking ethical decisions out of the hands of individual doctors 
and putting them into the hands of courts, which then 
(paradoxically) purport in their decisions to represent the 
ethical sensibilities of the medical profession. 
B. Saikewicz at the Appellate Level 
1. The Case 
In one sense, the result in the Saikewicz case was unsurprising 
-Saikewicz was old and terminally ill and so, realistically, he 
was not going to have the same value placed on his life as a 
young woman in stable condition like Karen Quinlan. On the 
other hand, he had a potentially treatable condition, and even 
though the treatment would only prolong life and not cure the 
disease, most competent patients would have opted for it 
regardless of the wisdom or rationality of such a choice. 
Because Saikewicz was severely retarded and his family took 
no interest in his case, the decision rested entirely on the 
shoulders of the state.36 
The Saikewicz opinion's preliminary discussion cited to "[t]he 
current state of medical ethics," in part as it was described by 
II one commentator," an author in the Journal of the American 
35. See DAVID J. ROlHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE 148-49 (1991) 
(discussing coterminousness of rise in technology with decline in trust of doctors); 
see also Robert J. Dzielak, Note, Physicians Lose the Tug of War to Pull the Plug: The 
Debate About Continued Futile Medical Care, 28 J. MARsHALL 1. REv. 733, 736-39 
(1995) (noting that "[u]ntil fairly recently, a patient did not control medical 
treatment decisions. Rather, a physician provided medical treatment which he 
felt was in the patient's best interests" and the patient complied). 
36. Saikewicz had two sisters who chose not to concern themselves with their 
brother's case. Saikewicz,370 N.E.2d at 420. 
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Medical Association in 1968.37 That author wrote that 
II extraordinary means of prolonging life or its semblance" 
should be avoided when the patient will not be able to recover 
and live "without intolerable suffering."38 On this basis, the 
court felt that its decision was in line with II the current medical 
ethos."39 
Turning to the legal ruling itself, after a substantial 
discussion of individual-rights issues such as privacy and 
informed consent, the court considered countervailing state 
interests.40 To do so, it surveyed a large sample of recent 
analogous cases in order to arrive at some common principles: 
II As distilled from the cases, the State has claimed interest in: 
(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of 
innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; (4) 
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession."41 
2. The Creation of the Ethical Integrity Standard 
The court singled out three cases as providing the 
precedential basis for EIMP:42 Georgetown College,43 Kennedy 
Hospital,44 and United States v. George.45 In Georgetown College, a 
Jehovah's Witness in need of a transfusion for her bleeding 
ulcer refused to consent to it. The hospital faced a difficult 
choice: if it treated the woman against her will, it exposed itself 
to civil or criminal liability for assault; if it let her die it exposed 
itself to liability for malpractice. In an opinion written after the 
transfusion was performed, the D.C. Circuit held that a patient 
could not place a doctor in this dilemma.46 While this opinion 
never explicitly mentioned ethics and the integrity of the 
37. Id. at 424. 
38. Id. (citing H. P. Lewis, Machine Medicine and Its Relation to the Fatally 1//, 206 
JAMA 387 (1968». 
39. Id. The court did not discuss what this· might mean in the context of the 
majority of competent patients, whom the lower court noted would have chosen 
to undergo the treatment notwithstanding "the current medical ethos." Id. 
40. Seeid. 
41. Id. at 425 (emphasis added). 
42 See id. at425-26. 
43. In re President and Dirs. of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. 
Cir.1964). 
44. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971). This case 
was overruled by a subsequent decision by the New Je.rsey Supreme Court. See In 
re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985). 
45. 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965). 
46. Georgetown College,331 F.2d at 1009. 
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medical profession in those terms, the Saikewicz court rightly 
understood the general sense of the case to mean that doctors 
performing their professional obligations adequately should 
not be exposed to liability.47 I restate this goal as "doctors 
should not have to worry about getting sued for doing the right 
thing, whatever the right thing is," or, for short, the "Liability 
Goal." 
In Kennedy Hospital, another Jehovah's Witness would not 
consent to a transfusion, here for her unconscious adult 
daughter who had been in a car accident. The mother even 
signed a release freeing the hospital from liability.48 The court 
held that the patient had no right to die, regardless of religion. 
The staff members of the hospital, who were "consecrated to 
preserving life," would commit malpractice if they did not 
perform the transfusion, no matter what the patient said.49 
More to the point, it was unfair for the patient to request partial 
treatment in a way that required the medical staff to violate its 
own standards. "When a hospital and staff are thus 
involuntary hosts and their interests are pitted against the 
belief of the patient," the court wrote, "we think it reasonable 
to resolve the problem by permitting the hospital and its staff 
to pursue their functions according to their professional 
standards."50 In other words, to the Kennedy Hospital court, the 
ethics of the medical profession trump the ethics and beliefs of 
patients. 
I restate this goal as, "the doctor's job is to care fully for you, 
to 'consecrate life'; you cannot ask her to treat you with one 
hand tied behind her back." I will call this the "Full Treatment 
Goal" for short. The Saikewicz court's reading was again 
accurate, with one departure.51 Kennedy Hospital 
unambiguously cast this goal as the interest of the medical 
staff, separate from the state's interest in preserving life.52 The 
Saikewicz court did not pretend otherwise,53 but transformed 
the doctor's interest into a part of the state's interest without 
47. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425 (citing Georgetown College). 
48. See Kennedy Hospital, 279 A.2d at 671. 
49. [d. at 672. 
50. [d. at 673. 
51. See 370 N.E.2d at 425. 
52 See 279 A.2d at 674. 
53. See 370 N.E.2d at 425. 
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explaining why or how. 
The third case, United States v. George, dealt with another 
Jehovah's Witness who refused a life-saving transfusion. As in 
Kennedy Hospital, the court's emphasis was on the Full 
Treatment Goal. In this case, too, a patient" submitted" to the 
doctors' care, then asked for a course of treatment that would 
constitute malpractice.54 The court held that "the doctor's 
conscience and professional oath must . . . be respected," and 
that a "patient may knowingly decline treatment, but he may 
not demand mistreatment."55 Of the three cases, this one 
comes the closest (though not in the portions just quoted) to 
explicitly dealing with ethical considerations, yet Saikewicz 
gives this case the least discussion. 56 
It is striking that none of the three cases that formed the basis 
for EIMP articulate anything resembling it. The Liability Goal, 
while worthy,57 is neither directly a state interest nor ethical in 
its scope. The Full Treatment Goal, while more directly 
concerned with medical standards (ethical and otherwise), 
sounds in these cases more like an individual doctor's interest, 
rather than one inhering in the profession as a whole or in the 
state. 
The years between these three precursor cases and Saikewicz 
saw a transformation from respecting medical ethics on an 
individual level to treating it as an "institutional 
consideration,,58 and giving the state a voice in constructing 
such ethics (as in Quinlan). Saikewicz, then, reflected this trend. 
The case combined the Liability and Full Treatment Goals, 
made them collective and professional rather than individual, 
and made them a state interest.59 To be sure, doctors and 
54. See George, 239 F. Supp. at 754. 
55.Id. 
56. See 370 N.E.2d at 425. 
57. But see Annas, supra note 28, at 107. Annas argues strenuously that courts' 
protection of doctors from liability has given doctors a "blank check," which they 
have "used ... to act irresponsibly," leaving "no strong medical ethics core to the 
medical profession." Without the strong ethical core, Annas contends, the 
medical profession is subject to unseemly market forces. In addition, without its 
ethical core, the medical profession is beginning to be treated as technicians for 
hire for such previously unacceptable duties as assisted suicide. See id. at 109. 
58. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427. 
59. Whatever transformation occurred in the meaning of "ethical integrity," the 
state interest was simply an overlay; the court spoke of "the integrity of the 
medical profession, the proper role of hospitals in caring for such patients . . . 
[and] the State's interest in protecting the same." Id. at426-27. 
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hospitals still had an interest in avoiding liability and 
aggressively treating their patients, but now the state had an 
interest in preserving the doctors' interest, and it was only the 
state's interest that countervailed the patient's right to refuse 
treatment.60 
Unfortunately, the Saikewicz court distilled this standard in a 
manner that lost something in the translation. The confusion is 
evident from an examination of the plain meaning of EIMP. 
Declaring a state interest in the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession sounds like saying" as a society, it is important that 
we guarantee that our doctors maintain high standards of 
ethical conduct," a concept that I call the "Societal Goal." 
The Liability Goal does not say this-it worries about letting 
doctors do their jobs without having to make a no-win choice 
about lawsuits. In the three cases discussed in Saikewicz, the 
doctors faced a dilemma of letting a patient die and committing 
malpractice on one hand or overriding a patient's non-consent 
and committing assault and battery on the other. As such, the 
situation posed no threat to the ethical integrity of the 
professioni such a threat would have come only from a choice 
in which only the more ethical of the two medical options 
exposed the doctor to liability. In such a case, a doctor would 
either have to expose himself to a lawsuit or be unethical. If 
rational actors would choose the latter, the ethical integrity of 
the profession would be undermined. 
The Full Treatment Goal is much closer to the Societal Goal, 
but it too loses something in the translation. In the case law 
leading up to Saikewicz, the Full Treatment Goal prevented 
patients from tying doctors' hands, but the very holding in 
Saikewicz makes it clear that "new" medical ethics might allow, 
or even require, less-than-Full Treatment. As the Saikewicz 
court put it, "[t]he force and impact of this interest is lessened 
by the prevailing medical ethical standards ... [which do not] 
demand that all efforts toward life prolongation be made in all 
60. It is certainly possible that one reason for the transformation of EIMP into a 
state interest is that the Saikewicz court and others like it found it unseemly to be 
weighing doctors' interests directly against those of their patients. Ideally, 
doctors' and patients' interests would be aligned on the same side, and even if 
these cases already represented a failure of that ideal, courts understandably 
might wish to avoid constructing a legal standard that drives this wedge in 
further. 
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circumstances."61 The Full Treatment Goal thus is transformed 
into an "Appropriate Treatment Goal": "you can ask a doctor to 
treat you less than fully, but only if such scaled-down 
treatment is consistent with medical ethics." As we will see, 
this Goal has been transformed (or, some might say, watered 
down) even further in the cases applying Saikewicz.62 
In sum, the ethical integrity standard was improvised from 
three Jehovah's Witnesses cases that reached opposite results 
from Saikewicz, had very different versions of "ethical 
integrity" (indeed, they never used the phrase), and did not 
assert their versions of "ethical integrity" as a state interest. 
3. The Application of the Ethical Integrity Standard 
The discussion of EIMP in Saikewicz is necessarily incomplete 
without considering the court's application of the rule. 
Examining the application surely should lend some guidance 
as to the court's interpretation of the interest. Unfortunately, 
even though the standard sounded relatively straightforward 
when first mentioned, the court applied it in a manner that 
greatly complicated matters. Some courts treat precedents and 
their language as rigid rules; others treat them as representing 
results to be harmonized. Either way, Saikewicz represents an 
unacceptable precedent; a court applying Saikewicz must 
choose between using the plain meaning (such as it is) of a rule 
constructed out of thin air and left unexplained, and using a 
standard confusingly and incoherently applied in the very case 
that created it. 
In examining the Saikewicz court's application of its EIMP 
rule, quoting the court in full offers the best overview (the 
emphasized portions in the quotation will receive special 
attention below): 
. As distilled from the cases, the State has claimed interest in: 
(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests 
of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and 
(4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession. 
61. Saikewicz,370 N.E.2d at 426. 
62 See infra Part N. 
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The last State interest requiring discussion is that of the 
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession as well as allowing hospitals the Jull opportunity to 
care Jor people under their control. The Jorce and impact oj this. 
interest is lessened by the prevailing medical ethical 
standards. Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, 
without exception, demand that all efforts toward life 
prolongation be made in all circumstances. Rather, as 
indicated in Quinlan, the prevailing ethical practice seems to 
be to recognize that the dying are more often in need of 
comfort than treatment. Recognition of the right to reJuse 
necessary treatment in appropriate circumstances is consistent 
with existing medical mores; such a doctrine does not threaten 
either the integrity of the medical profession, the proper role 
of hospitals in caring for such patients or the State's interest 
in protecting the same. It is not necessary to deny a right of 
self-determination to a patient in order to recognize the 
interests of doctors, hospitals, and medical personnel in 
attendance on the patient. Also, if the doctrines of informed 
consent and right of privacy have as their foundations the 
right to bodily integrity, and control of one's own fate, then 
those rights are superior to the institutional considerations . 
. . . [T]he [interest in] protection of the ethical integrity of the 
medical profession was satisfied on two grounds. The probate 
judge's decision was in accord with the testimony of the 
attending physicians of the patient. The decision is in accord 
with the generally accepted views of the medical profession, 
as set forth in this opinion.63 
507 
Each of the italicized portions represents a significant 
discontinuity in the application of the rule. 
The court's application of its new rule suggests that it was 
blazing its own trail in creating EIMP; thus, looking to the three 
precursor cases provides an incomplete guide to the meaning 
of the new standard. But, the court fails to either explain this 
activist transformation or to define the new trail in careful or 
consistent terms. Examining these discontinuities shows the 
frustrating incoherence in the Saikewicz standard and 
foreshadows the main themes developed in the rest of this 
Article. . 
63. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425-27 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
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a. "as well as allowing hospitals . .. " 
When the Saikewicz court first mentions EIMP as one of four 
state interests, EIMP is simple and unadorned with subclauses, 
but in its application of the rule the court inexplicably adds, 1/ as 
well as allowing hospitals the full opportunity to care for 
people under their control.,,64 This reference undoubtedly 
identifies the Full Treatment Goal from Kennedy Hospital and 
United States v. George. By mentioning this goal alongside and 
separately from the ethical integrity standard, the court seems 
to be suggesting that the latter does not encompass the former, 
but the ethical integrity standard was formed from the Full 
Treatment Goal and the Liability Goal. Separating out Full 
Treatment leaves only Liability, and this result simply could 
not be what the Saikewicz court meant by "ethical integrity of 
the medical profession."65 So if 1/ ethical integrity" does not 
mean Full Treatment, and it does not mean Liability, what does 
it mean? Because the formal listing of the four state interests 
only mentions 1/ ethical integrity," without the Full Treatment 
subclause, should applications of Saikewicz include the 
subclause or not? The court gives absolutely no guidance. 
A further point: it is unclear how the hospital's interest 
functions in the middle of a state interest. Protecting the 
interests of innocent third parties is its own, separate prong of 
the state-interest test; perhaps the hospital's and doctor's 
interests represent a specialized version of this interest, handed 
over to the state for convenience (although the hospital is 
actually a named party here).66 If the court intended this 
meaning, the state-interest test would then basically translate 
as: (1) preservation of life-people shouldn't die; (2) protection 
of innocent third parties-people shouldn't die if third parties 
will be harmed; (3) prevention of suicide-people shouldn't die 
at their own hands; (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the 
medical profession - people shouldn't die at the hands of 
doctors. The last point would then be bifurcated: (a) if doctors 
64. ld. at 426. The court also subdivides the standard later in the paragraph, 
speaking of lithe integrity of the medical profession, the proper role of hospitals in 
caring for such patientsL and] ... the State's interest in protecting the same." ld. 
at 426-27. 
65. Although the Liability Goal is relatively unimportant in Saikewicz (as it is 
relegated to a footnote in the case), it is still part of the calculus. See id. at 427 n.12. 
66. See supra note 60. 
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"kill" people it undermines the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession; (b) doctors should have rein to treat people as fully 
as they are capable. These two prongs implicate, roughly 
speaking, the Societal Goal and the Full Treatment Goal. This 
test would apply the rule fairly coherently, relatively consistent 
with underlying precedent and the plain meaning of the court's 
words. Unfortunately, the court never states its meaning 
clearly, and maddeningly, the court proceeds to confuse 
matters further as its application of the rule continues. 
h. "[t]heforce and impact of this interest is lessened . .. " 
Which interest does the court mean by "this" interest? It has 
just listed two: "straight" EIMP and the Full Treatment 
subclause. The obvious reading is that the lessened interest is 
Full Treatment, because the rest of the paragraph discusses it. 
Indeed, this portion of the Saikewicz opinion marks the formal 
transformation ("lessen[ing]") of Full into Appropriate 
Treatment. The other reading, that prevailing standards of 
medical ethics have lessened the importance of maintaining the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession, does not sound like 
something the court intends, but it is not an illogical reading. 
After all, the formation of hospital ethics boards and the shift 
toward greater accommodation of patient choice, exemplified 
by Quinlan and Saikewicz, could be seen as making the 
maintenance interest-specifically the portion that says 
"doctors shouldn't go around 'killing' people" -less urgent. It 
is also conceivable that the court meant this statement to apply 
to both Full and Appropriate Treatment as two halves of a 
single interest. Again, the court's lack of clarity leaves the 
meaning indeteinrlnate. 
c. "[tJhe right to refuse necessary treatment . .. does not 
threaten ... " 
The presumption by the court-that allowing some patients 
to refuse treatment is consistent with medical ethics - is not 
particularly controversial.67 What is harder to accept, and what 
the court glosses over, is the presumption that because 
allowing treatment-refusal is consistent with medical ethics, it 
67. In this particular case, the presumption is controversial, or at least should 
be. See supra Part II. 
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does not threaten the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession. 
It is difficult to evaluate whether or not this is the case, in 
large part because it is unclear what the court means by 
maintaining" ethical integrity." But if we assume that the court 
means that the state has an interest in maintaining trust and 
confidence that doctors consistently act ethically,68 it is at best 
optimistic, and at worst dangerous, to leave it completely up to 
the profession itself to define its standards. To take an obvious 
(if extreme) example, just because Nazi doctors had no ethical 
qualms about human experimentation does not mean that the 
ethical integrity of Nazi doctors did not suffer.69 Indeed, it 
means exactly the opposite, especially when EIMP is expressed 
as the interest of the State, not the doctors. Although there are 
valid policy reasons for having doctors and not judges define 
medical ethics, such an approach has definite" agency costs" as 
well, costs that the Saikewicz court did not consider. The 
dangers of allowing any group - particularly a group with 
power over life and death-to police itself and define the moral 
bounds of its own conduct are clear. This discontinuity is 
discussed in greater length in the final portion of this Article.7° 
d. fl ••• those rights are superior to the institutional considerations. II 
On the whole, the contribution of Saikewicz to American 
jurisprudence was not its articulation of a catchy state-interest 
calculus but its strong statement in favor of the right to refuse 
treatment. The Saikewicz court effectively concluded that, 
whatever the basis and extent of the ethical integrity state 
interest, the patient's personal rights trump it. Moreover, the 
holding of the case states: "Finding no State interest sufficient 
to counterbalance a patient's decision to decline life-prolonging 
medical treatment in the circumstances of this case, we 
conclude that the patient's right to privacy and 
68. Cf. 7 OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 1066 (2d ed. 1989) (defining integrity as: 
"The condition of not being marred or violated; unimpaired or uncorrupted 
condition; original perfect state; soundness," and "Soundness of moral principle; 
the character of uncorrupted virtue, esp. in relation to truth and fair dealing; 
uprightness, honesty, sincerity."). 
69. See Ptolemy H. Taylor, Execution of the "Artificially Competent": Crnel and 
Unusual?, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1045, 1063 n.l25 (1992). 
70. See infra Part VII. 
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self-determination is entitled to enforcement."71 
The primacy of the patient's right to refuse treatment 
exposes a weakness in the Saikewicz approach. If the patient's 
right prevails, the "institutional considerations" are set aside. 
Only if the patient's right does not prevail (as in the three 
precursor cases from which Saikewicz constructed EIMP) do the 
institutional considerations matter. The court takes no interest, 
then, in preserving the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession in those cases where the patient is allowed to die. 
That is, the law makes no attempt to maximize the sum of the 
patient's and state's interests. Instead, it merely measures the 
two elements, with the larger of the two winning all. As shown 
below, some subsequent courts confronted this problem and 
began (wisely, I argue) to take the sum-maximization 
approach; "Justice as Optimizer," rather than "Justice as 
Scales."72 But Saikewicz itself did not. As a result, the very case 
that created EIMP strongly stated that the interest did not 
matter very much. 
e. " ... satisfied on two grounds . . . " 
The preceding sections were more of a discussion of the 
ethical integrity interest than an application of it. When the 
court finally applies the standard explicitly, it cites two reasons 
to conclude that EIMP is satisfied. First, the lower court's 
decision to let Mr. Saikewicz die was consistent with the 
opinions of the doctors attending him. Second, the decision 
was consistent with medical ethics in general. 
The first factor is truly baffling. Nowhere in the previous 
statement and discussion of the ethical integrity standard were 
the wishes of attending physicians mentioned. Another 
unexplained facet of EIMP is thus introduced, because neither 
the Full Treatment nor the Liability Goal fits here. Perhaps the 
court meant that the lower court decision was validated by the 
attending physicians' expert recommendation against 
71. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 435. The court's reference to "a patient's decision" 
applied to Mr. Saikewicz even though he was incapable of making a decision, 
because the court had earlier made clear that the right to refuse medical treatment 
extended to incompetent patients (via "substituted judgment") as well as 
competent ones. ld. at 427, 430-31. 
72 See infra Part N. 
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chemotherapy.73 Perhaps the court meant that EIMP entails not 
forcing doctors to act in contravention of their own personal 
interpretation of medical ethics. There is no way to know for 
sure. 
One interpretation of this new interest would say that EIMP 
is not a matter of the individual treating physician's 
interpretation of medical ethics, but rather a matter for that 
physician's conscience. This distinction is subtle, but 
important. Medical ethics, a court would say under this view, 
is the province of ethical boards and the profession as a whole. 
Individual doctors cannot speak for medical ethics, but only for 
their own beliefs. That said, however, respecting those 
individual beliefs is important. I would restate this interest as 
saying, "a doctor should not have to violate her conscience in 
acceding to a patient's request and a court's enforcement of 
that request," and call it the "Individual Conscience Goal." 
As discussed above, the ethical integrity standard was 
transformed in Saikewicz into a professional, "institutional 
concern," and part of a state interest. Individual Conscience is 
presumably a state interest only in the sense that the state is 
representing third-party interests in general in these 
proceedings.74 It is an institutional interest only insofar as 
integrity of the profession as a whole rests on respecting the 
rights of its individual practitioners. 
Whatever the Saikewicz court meant by this, the significant 
point is that the court saw the opinion of Mr. Saikewicz's 
doctors in favor of letting him die as a reason to dismiss the 
state interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession, instead of seeing it as a reason to subject it to extra 
scrutiny. This disturbing dismissal recalls the earlier Nazi 
analogy. 
The second ground that the court found to satisfy the ethical 
integrity interest was that withholding treatment from 
Saikewicz was consistent with medical ethics in genera1.75 
73. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 419. 
74. Cj. Matthew S. Feigenbaum, Minors, Medical Treatment, and Interspousal 
Disagreement: Should Solomon Split the Child?, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 841, 858 (1992) 
(arguing that interest of ethical integrity is a general concern of medical 
profession, but that the state is the proper vehicle for asserting it). 
75. This ground touches on the Liability Goal, though very obliquely and only 
implicitly; one might presume that a doctor following the ethical dictates of the 
professional authorities would be less susceptible to an adverse judgment in a 
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Notably, as with the first ground on which the ethical integrity 
interest was satisfied, society has no protection against medical 
ethics gone awry. If medical ethics agree with the "desires" of 
a patient (here, a patient with no means of expressing any 
desires), the state assumes that the ethical integrity of the 
profession is protected. Once again, the specter of the Nazi 
doctor looms, and society is protected only by a weak 
assessment of the patient's intent. Such a result contravenes 
the Societal Goal- the plain meaning of EIMP - very directly. 
All of these analytical threads most likely reflect a pragmatic 
(perhaps results-oriented) approach by the court. The liberty 
interest is relatively new and powerful here; indeed, its forceful 
application is the reason that Saikewicz (like Quinlan) was a 
significant case. Having already decided that this powerful 
individual right trumps the "most significant" state interest, 
the interest in preserving life,76 it was highly unlikely that the 
court would determine that a poorly defined and less weighty 
interest would tip the balance in the other direction. 
Unfortunately, taking this approach prevented the court from 
providing a proper explication of the ethical integrity standard, 
even as it wrote that standard into law. 
4. Conclusion 
The legacy of Saikewicz is a confused one. In asserting a state 
interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession, the SJC affirmed the ethically questionable 
decisions made by the doctors and judge below; it found 
precedent for EIMP in cases that did not assert anything like 
the standard and did not use any similar words; it stated and 
applied the standard in multiple puffs that weJ;e frustratingly 
inconsistent in content and phrasing; it made absolutely no 
effort to explain what EIMP was supposed to mean; and it 
stated that the standard had little if any weight that the court 
was bound to respect. 
malpractice suit. It matches the Full Treatment Goal as well, though here too the 
connection is not made explicit and is somewhat tenuous. The connection is this: 
a doctor acting consistently with the ethical dictates of the professional authorities 
is presumptively providing full treatment, or at least appropriate treatment. 
As mentioned before, the court had already diluted the Full Treatment Goal sub 
silentio (because of the recognition of the powerful liberty interest) into the 
Appropriate Treatment Goal. As we will see, this is the test that a sizable number 
of courts adopting the Saikewicz test have used. 
76. Saikewicz,370 N.E.2d at 425. 
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In the next Part, I will argue that this confusion is reflected in 
how Saikewicz has been applied. Subsequent courts have 
looked to Saikewicz to find the state-interest rule; finding it, 
they have had little basis for intelligible application of it. 
Instead of scrutinizing the language of Saikewicz, or re-
evaluating its basis, most subsequent courts have simply 
applied it blindly, with a "mechanical reliance" that is 
surprising given the Saikewicz court's own self-conscious 
declaration of activism. All of these approaches have 
contributed to making the II ethical integrity standard" into a 
cipher, protecting nothing. 
IV. APPUCATIONS 
Before exarrurung how the Saikewicz standard has been 
applied by other courts, it is useful to collect and re-analyze the 
various Goals that have appeared so far in the discussion. 
1. Liability Goal: Doctors should not be exposed to liability for 
doing the "right thing" ethically. 
This approach appeared in Georgetown College.77 
2. Full Treatment Goal: The doctor's job is to fully care for 
patients; patients cannot ask doctors to treat them with one hand tied 
behind their backs, and the State will not force doctors to do so. 
This approach appeared in Kennedy Hospital and United States 
v. George. 
3. The Appropriate Treatment Goal: The doctor's job is to fUlly 
care for patients; patients cannot ask a doctor to treat them with one 
hand tied behind her back But a patient has a right to refuse certain 
treatment, and "fUll care" does not have to include such treatment 
when withholding it is consistent with modem medical ethical 
principles. 
This modification of the Full Treatment Goal was stated 
along with (though not clearly subsumed within) EIMP in the 
Saikewicz court's introduction to its discussion of the standard. 
4. The Individual Conscience Goal: A doctor should not have to 
violate her conscience in acceding to a patient's request and a court's 
enforcement of that request. 
I interpret this goal as appearing implicitly in the actual 
77. The Liability Goal also played a role in the Quinlan decision, as highlighted 
in Annas, supra note 28, at 98-99. 
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application of the ethical integrity standard in Saikewicz, when 
the court said the standard was satisfied in part by the 
testimony of the attending physician supporting termination of 
treatment. 
5. The Societal Goal: A society must guarantee that its doctors 
maintain consistently high standards of ethical conduct. 
In the three cases from which the Saikewicz EIMP standard 
was derived, the right to die was not yet established, and so the 
Societal Goal was equated with the notion that it would be bad 
for society to have doctors llkillingll people. As argued in this 
Part, subsequent courts have incorrectly read Saikewicz's EIMP 
standard to refer to this older, II pro-life" version of the Societal 
Goal. As the pro-life approach to medical treatment decision 
has faded (due in large part to Saikewicz, Quinlan, and their 
progeny), courts now view the state interest in EIMP as having 
faded as well, and thus they have largely ignored it. 
Nevertheless, the Saikewicz court's determination that the 
state has an interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the 
medical profession is still relevant. Taken at face value - which 
my definition of the Societal Goal attempts to do - EIMP is not 
about protecting life at all cost, it is about having ethical 
doctors. Instead of ignoring EIMP, courts should seek effective 
ways to maintain it. One crucial aspect of any effort to 
maintain EIMP must be to foster a broader societal dialogue on 
medical ethics while refusing to allow the medical 
establishment to self-define its own ethical boundaries. 
These five significant alternate interpretations define the 
concept of IImaintaining the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession" for the purposes of evaluating the application of 
EIMP in subsequent cases. Dozens of these cases exist, and I 
have collected, generalized and organized these cases so as to 
highlight their distinctive themes. 
Saikewicz has had a major impact on this nation's 
jurisprudence, simply by virtue of the number of state courts 
that have felt the need to cite it. In addition to the Supreme 
Court's discussion in Glucksberg, the Saikewicz state-interest test 
appears in the jurisprudence of twenty-one states, the District 
of Columbia, and several federal courts, in cases either citing 
Saikewicz directly or citing cases that cite Saikewicz?8 Most of 
78. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) 
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these cases concern the right to refuse treatment, and most of 
the treatment-refusal cases involve life or death 
determinations. The ramifications of the use (and non-use) of 
the Saikewicz EIMP standard in other areas related to the 
medical profession (such as abortion, assisted suicide, and the 
death penalty) will follow, as will the culmination of EIMP's 
development: its adoption by the Supreme Court in Glucksberg. 
The first striking attribute of the application of the ethical 
integrity standard is the frequency with which it is explicitly 
stated as part of the state interest, but then wholly ignored. For 
these courts, EIMP is worth mentioning, but does not represent 
a significant factor. Of the roughly 80 cases I have found that 
actually mention the standard, approximately 20 percent fit 
into this category, neglecting even to pretend to apply EIMP.79 
This high proportion of outright snubs of the standard 
supports my argument that the Saikewicz EIMP standard is 
essentially meaningless. I discern no pattern among this fifth 
of the cases that explains why those particular courts did not 
apply the standard. 
One can only speculate as to why these courts ignored the 
ethical integrity standard even after quoting it. Two main 
possibilities present themselves. First, the cases involving the 
right to refuse treatment involve relatively weightier interests: 
(1) the right to privacy and to refuse treatment; and (2) the 
state's interest in preserving life, preventing suicide, and 
rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg. 521 U.S. 702 (1997); McKenzie v. 
Doctors' Hosp., 765 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Deel v. Syracuse Veterans 
Admin. Med. Ctr., 729 F. Supp. 231 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 
580 (D.R.!. 1988); Tune v. WaIter Reed Army Med. Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 
(D.D.C. 1985); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979); Rasmussen v. 
Fleming. 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); Thor v. Superior Ct., 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993); 
Stamford Hosp. v. Vega, 674 A2d 821 (Conn. 1996); In re AC., 573 A2d 1235 
(D.c. 1990); In re Severns 425 A2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re Browning. 568 So. 2d 4 
(Fla. 1990); State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 
(Ill. 1989); Mack v. Mack, 618 A2d 744 (Md. 1993); In re Beth, 587 N.E.2d 1377 
(Mass. 1992); In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); In re Torres, 
357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988); 
McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990); In re Farrell, 529 A2d 404 (N.]. 
1987); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986); State ex ref. Schuetzle v. Vog~l, 
537 N.W.2d 358 (N.D. 1995); Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809 (OhiO 
c.P. 1980); In re Fiori, 673 A2d 905 (pa. 1996); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 
1987); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992); State ex ref. White v. Narick, 292 
S.E.2d54 (W. Va. 1982). 
79. See, e.g., Mack v. Mack, 618 A2d, 744, 755 n.7 (Md. 1993); In re Beth, 587 
N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Mass. 1992); State ex ref. Schuetzle, 537 N.W.2d 358, 360 (N.D. 
1995). 
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protecting third parties' interests. Adding an additional, 
"minor" state interest would complicate the calculus in ways 
that are only necessary if the larger interests are in relative 
balance. Moreover, because these particular cases are not close 
ones, the courts can simply disregard the ethical integrity 
standard.so 
The second possibility is that it is unclear to courts just what 
the Saikewicz ethical integrity standard actually means. As 
discussed, Saikewicz took several background cases, 
transformed their principles beyond recognition to form EIMP, 
and then mangled the interest further by applying it 
incoherently. Given, again, the relatively light weight of the 
interest, a court might choose not to figure out the exact 
meaning of the interest, notwithstanding the duty of courts to 
explain their decisions in light of precedent. Perhaps the light 
weight of the interest also explains an additional 10 percent of 
these cases, in which the courts do not ignore the ethical 
integrity standard per se, but they simply declare that it does 
not affect the result without any application of the standard or 
explanation as to what it means.S1 
The most striking example of a court completely ignoring the 
ethical integrity standard comes in People v. Kevorkian, S2 a 
Michigan case that does not apply the Saikewicz standard. In 
dissent, one of the Justices cites the four Saikewicz state 
interests, which had been applied in an earlier Michigan Court 
of Appeals decision.83 In its analysis of these interests, 
however, the dissent fails to discuss the ethical integrity prong. 
80. The examples cited in the previous footnote involve two species of cases 
that courts have found relatively easy to decide upon-people in vegetative states 
and prisoners-in contrast to more complicated cases involving children or 
patients with readily treatable conditions. 
81. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1370 (D. Mass. 1979); In re A.c., 
533 A.2d 611, 615 (D.c. 1987) (EIMP "not relevant here"); In re McCauley, 565 
N.E.2d 411, 414 (Mass. 1991). 
One particularly Significant example of this is the Crnzan case. Cruzan v. 
Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988). After reciting the state-interest litany, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri declared without explanation that "only the state's 
interest in the preservation of life is implicated." Id. at 419. As a result, EIMP was 
not at issue when Crnzan was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
where it became a landmark case concerning the rights of family members to 
discontinue life-sustaining treatment. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
82. 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994). 
83. See id. at 757 (Mallett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing In 
re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992». 
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This failure is highly significant because physician-assisted 
suicide and Dr. Kevorkian's approach to it have so clearly 
implicated the ethical integrity of the medical profession. 
Perhaps this omission occurred because Kevorkian's medical 
license was suspended, and so he did not represent the medical 
profession, but if anything this underlines the threat posed by 
the issue to the medical profession's ethical integrity. 
While a significant number of the cases I have examined 
(approximately 30 percent) recite the mantra of the Saikewicz 
EIMP standard without further discussion, in the majority of 
cases courts dutifully try to apply it. Nonetheless, they have 
not agreed on what EIMP means, and many of these courts 
explicitly say that it is the least important of the four state 
interests identified in Saikewicz.84 Those courts that apply EIMP 
do so mechanically, citing the state-interest prongs with 
"talismanic regularity"85 but with only the shallowest of 
analyses.86 None of them have chosen the most self-evident 
textual interpretation, the Societal Goal. In a jurisprudential 
vicious cycle, no precedent supports the plain meaning 
interpretation, which is now buried under an accretion of other 
interpretations. For the most part, courts have chosen the 
Appropriate Treatment Goal (applied by determining whether 
or not the patient's preferred course of treatment is consistent 
with modern medical ethical principles), the Individual 
Conscience Goal (applied by determining if the doctor in 
question is able to opt out of performing the procedure in 
question), or both. 
84. See, e.g., In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990) (EIMP is "least 
Significant" state interest). One commentator, in tracing the descent of the EIMP 
standard into uselessness in Florida, cites Brownings negative language as a 
significant turning point. See Lester J. Perling, Health Care Advance Directives: 
Implications for Florida Mental Health Patients, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 193, 213-14 
(1993). But see Scott J. Davidson, But, Why Do We Shoot Horses: An Analysis of the 
Right to Die and Euthanasia, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 115,128-29 (1994) (arguing 
that EIMP is the "most justified" state interest even though it amounts to little, 
given that the current medical ethical consensus does not require full treatment). 
85. Thomas William Mayo, Constilutionalizing the "Right to Die, " 49 MD. L. REV. 
103,112 n.45 (1990). 
86. See Diane E. Hoffmann, The Maryland Health Care Decisions Act: Achieving the 
Right Balance?, 53 MD. L. REV. 1064, 1096 (1994) (noting that most courts pay "lip 
service" to EIMP)i Michael R. Fuller, Just Whose Life Is It?: Establishing a 
Constitutional Right for PhYSician-Assisted Euthanasia, 23 Sw. U. L. REV. 103, 126 
(1993) (noting that despite the number of cases mentioning EIMP, "almost none 
have attempted to discuss the issue in depth"). 
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A. Appropriate Treatment 
The majority of the cases acknowledging the four Saikewicz 
state interests have held that the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession prong is satisfied when the act of allowing the 
patient to refuse treatment is consistent with current standards 
of medical ethics. Wons v. Public Health Trust,87 a Florida case 
concerning a Jehovah's Witness who refused a transfusion, 
uses fairly typical language: 
Finally, as to the state's interest in maintaining the ethical 
integrity of medical practice, the court [in Ramsey, a similar 
case,] concluded that such interest could not justify the 
blood transfusion in this case. The court adopted its prior 
Perlmutter analysis on this question which in a nutshell holds 
that it is consistent with medical ethics to recognize a patient's 
right to refuse medical treatment under appropriate 
circumstances. It goes without saying, however, that the 
medical personnel who accede to the patient's wishes in 
refusing medical assistance in these circumstances, cannot, 
the court says, be held criminally or civilly liable for their 
conduct.88 
The Court then went on to conclude, based on Ramsey89 and 
Perlmutter,9O that because this case presented no ethical 
dilemma, the state interest in maintaining the ethical integrity 
of the medical profession was" entirely absent."91 
Two things are noteworthy here. First, the Liability Goal 
makes a (rare) appearance, though not as part of the ethical 
integrity standard itself.92 Second, by affirming Perlmutter (the 
first case to apply Saikewicz in Florida),93 the Wons court 
accepted a decisive and limited view of the ethical integrity 
standard. Perlmutter had adhered tightly to Saikewicz's 
transformation of the Full Treatment Goal to the Appropriate 
Treatment Goal- the notion that medical ethics does not 
87. 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. ct. App. 1987). 
88. ld. at 686 (emphasis added). 
89. St. Mary's Hospital v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) 
90. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 379 So. 2d 
359 (Fla. 1980). 
91. Wons, 500 So. 2d at 687. 
92. For a keen analysis of forced cesarean cases that argues for taking the 
Liability, Individual Conscience and Appropriate Treatment Goals into 
consideration (though not using my terminology), see Eric M. Levine, The 
Constitutionality o/Court-Ordered Cesarean Surgery: A Threshold Question, 4 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 229, 276-77 (1994). 
93. Perlmuller, 362 So. 2d at 163. 
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necessarily always equal life at any cost.94 According to the 
Appropriate Treatment Goal, if current medical mores would 
allow patient choice in a case, the interest in maintaining the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession is not threatened, 
and the weight of the interest is "lessened" or even "entirely 
absent" in the calculUS.95 
Wons is a vivid example of just how empty the Saikewicz test 
has become as the right to refuse treatment has expanded.96 
Remember that the three cases from which Saikewicz derived 
the ethical integrity standard, like Wons, involved Jehovah's 
Witnesses who refused transfusions. In all three of those cases, 
however, the courts forbade refusal of treatment, while the 
Wons court allowed it. What had changed in the meantime is 
that, independent of EIMP, Saikewicz and Quinlan had elevated 
patient choice to a more respected status. However, unlike 
Saikewicz and Quinlan, in Wons the court faced a person who 
essentially rejected her ticket to a full and healthy life.97 Wons is 
not unusual in holding that such people can nevertheless 
choose to risk (or embrace) death, notwithstanding the state's 
interest in EIMP, because the right to refuse treatment has 
substantially expanded. 98 
94. Id. at 163-64 (quoting Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27). 
95. Id.i see a/so Kristi E. Scrode, Life in Limbo: Revising Policies for Permanently 
Unconscious Patients, 31 HOus. L. REv. 1609, 1666 (1994) (arguing that EIMP is 
overridden in cases involving permanent-vegetative-state patients because 
medical ethics is consistent with death, and individual rights trump the four state-
interest prongs). 
96. As argued above, the EIMP standard was empty from its beginning in 
Saikewicz. Perhaps it was the Saikewicz court's intent to assert EIMP in this hollow 
form, so as to make clear that notions of medical ethical integrity should never 
stand in the way of personal autonomy and the right to rerose treatment. 
Regardless of the court's intent, however, the plain language of EIMP held the 
potential for future courts to assert the Societal Goal. 
97. Thus, cases of incurable, terminal patients who wish to forego some sort of 
treatment are less controversial, and application of this sort of analysis leads more 
easily to a conclusion that EIMP is not implicated. 
98. Many such cases involve adult Jehovah's Witnesses refusing treatment for 
themselves. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Doctors' Hosp., 765 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D. Fla. 
1991)i Stamford Hosp. v. Vega, 674 A.2d 821 (Conn. 1996); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 
322 (Ill. 1989)i Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1991). 
Nonetheless, numerous cases involve non-religious-based requests by competent, 
curable adults to withhold treatment. See, e.g., Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 
1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (involving a prisoner on hunger strike); Lane v. 
Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (involving a gangrene patient 
refusing life-saving amputation). Other cases involve discontinuing life support 
for quaClriplegics whose only "illness" is that they need a respirator or other life-
sustaining assistance. See, e.g., State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); McKay 
v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990). 
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That the right to refuse treatment was quickly extended to 
curable people is no surprise to anyone who has followed this 
area of the law even casually. In this context, it shows that the 
purpose of the ethical integrity test was turned completely 
inside-out without any explanation. EIMP originated as a reason 
-a weight on one side of the scale-to require people to accept 
treatment; the state had an interest in not having doctors let 
people die. When medical ethics changed, allowing doctors to 
let people die in some situations, EIMP became either a weight 
on the other side of the scale or a nullity.99 In other words, 
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession 
means only that doctors have to act according to the current 
acceptable standards of medical ethics, as defined by courts 
that typically defer to the medical establishment. If they do so, 
the ethical integrity of the profession is supposedly not 
threatened. 
However, in these Jehovah's Witness forced-transfusion 
cases, and in treatment-refusal cases in general, can one really 
accept that maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession requires an opposite result today from what it 
required thirty years ago? What has changed, apparently, is 
respect for patient autonomy and, perhaps, for religiOUS 
freedom.loo But, according to the Saikewicz line of cases, 
showing this shift from the Full Treatment to the Appropriate 
99. Interestingly, the cases do not agree precisely on which side of the scale to 
place the interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the profession. Most 
courts have held that the ethical integrity interest is not "in conflict" with the 
patient's right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Thor v. Superior Ct., 855 P.2d 375, 386 
(Cal. 1993); In re Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1270 (Mass. 1992). In many cases 
permitting forced treatment, ethical integrity weighs in on the winning side, 
adverse to the patient's right to choose. See, e.g., Rockville Gen. Hosp. v. Mercier, 
No. CV-90-44838-S, 1992 WL 335218 (Conn. Super. ct. Nov. 9, 1992) (requiring 
forced treatment for psychiatric patient); In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411, 414 
(Mass. 1991) (requiring forced transfusion for child with leukemia, contrary to 
Jehovah's Witness parents' wishes). But see In re Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 334 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1994) (holding ethical integrity forbids forcing woman to have cesarean 
section). Similarly, a handful of courts have placed ethical integrity along with 
the rest of the state interests, adverse to and outweighing the patient's interest. 
See, e.g., In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); In re Torres, 
357 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Minn. 1984). While the ethical integrity standard has been 
both on the winning side and losing side, as well as held to not matter, it has 
never been a dispositive factor in any case. 
100. Perfect autonomy and religious freedom have limits; people may not 
refuse transfusions on behalf of their small children. See, e.g., In re McCauley, 565 
N.E.2d 411, 414 (Mass. 1991) (preventing Jehovah's Witnesses from withholding a 
transfusion from a child; mentioning but not applying EIMP). 
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Treatment Goals, (1) to let the Jehovah's Witness in need of a 
transfusion die before would have been adverse to the ethical 
integrity of the medical profession; and (2) to do so now would 
not be adverse. Leaving aside which position is ethically 
superior, how can this be logically consistent? 
Two possible answers may reconcile these propositions, but 
neither has been offered by any of the courts in these cases. 
Perhaps maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession requires doctors to act consistently with officially 
promulgated medical ethics. Stated more weakly, perhaps it 
requires doctors to act in ways that are not inconsistent with 
the views of a significant portion of the medical ethical 
establishment. In some courts' views, then, the ethical integrity 
interest is not implicated in cases like Wons, because medical 
ethics no longer clearly requires forcing transfusions 
(regardless of whether a religious interest is involved). 
This answer has some merit to it, although it might then be 
more accurate to recast EIMP as maintaining the ethical 
consistency of the medical profession. Still, merely following 
the medical ethical establishment has another serious flaw as a 
basis for EIMP. While maintaining this consistency makes 
sense in a vacuum, it does not make sense when we consider 
its use in practice. If the patient's preferred course of action is 
to refuse treatment, and this does not contravene medical 
ethics, the doctor must obey the patient.101 But whatever the 
patient wants, and whether or not the doctor agrees, the doctor 
cannot outwardly act in contravention of medical ethics in a life 
or death situation without being disciplined or losing her 
license.102 As such, it is unclear what extra is accomplished by 
grounding EIMP entirely on the dictates of the medical ethical 
establishment. 
Viewing this point from another angle is instructive. It is 
highly unlikely that a court would allow the patient's rights to 
101. In some of these cases, the doctor is not an adverse party. In Wons and 
many other cases, however, the doctor is. The question of the doctor's interest is 
explored below and includes an examination of holdings that refuse to force a 
particular doctor to perform the procedure in question if a willing practitioner can 
be found. 
102 Cj. Su~an v. Board of Registration in Med., 662 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 
(Mass. 1996) (noting authority of medical registration board to sanction doctors 
for "conduct which undermined public confidence in the integrity of the medical 
profession"). 
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trump the state's interest in preserving life (or vice versa) if 
doing so clearly contravened established medical ethics, 
because no certified doctors would be available to perform the 
procedure in question. This is evident from the fact that none 
of the cases passing the /I consistency with ethics" test have 
ruled in favor of forced treatment, except in areas where 
doctors have traditionally treated the unwilling.103 
If the court were to allow patients' rights to trump 
established medical ethics, a court would essentially be forcing 
a change in the establishment. Presumably the medical 
establishment would respond to a court's decision, which 
effectively moots the purpose of looking to formal medical 
ethical dictates in evaluating EIMP. Whether or not it realized 
it, the court would be an actor in shaping medical ethics. In 
practice, though, the law has lagged behind developments in 
medical ethics,104 reluctant to allow all of the new permutations 
that modem ethicists have approved and that the medical 
establishment will allow. 
Consistency with medical ethics is thus a necessary condition 
of any decision, not a factor that can be balanced against the 
patient's liberty interest. Furthermore, and not meant to be 
understated here, it is not a sufficient condition, because 
history has shown that letting doctors define their own rules is 
not always wise.10S 
103. All of the exceptional cases, in which medical ethics require treahnent 
despite the wishes of the patient, involve curable children (i.e., the parents' wishes 
are contravened) or prisoners, two cases in which the liberty/privacy/choice 
interest is diminished. See, e.g., Polk County Sheriff v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 594 N.W.2d 
421, 428 (Iowa 1999) (involving a pre-trial detainee refusin~ dialysis); 
Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 458 (Mass. 1979) (involving 
a prisoner refusing dialysis); In re Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1066-67 
(Mass. 1978) (involving curable child patient); Commonwealth v. Kallinger, 580 
A.2d 887, 892-93 (pa. Commw. Ct 1990) (involving a prisoner attempting a 
hunger strike). 
104. See, e.g., Todd David Robichaud, Toward a More Perfect Union: A Federal 
Cause of Action for Physician Aid-in-Dying, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 521, 537-39 
(1994). 
105. See Daniel Robert Mordarski, Medical Futility: Has Ending Life Support 
Become the Next "Pro-Choice/Right to Life" Debate?, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV.' 751,775-76 
(1993) (noting that deferring to medical ethics as defined by doctors is itself a 
threat to ethical integrity of medical profession); see also Katherine A. Taylor, 
Compelling Pregnancy at Death's Door, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 85, 110 (1997) 
(warning against ceding to doctors state's power to define ethical obligations); J. 
BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY 64-68, 97-120 (1975), cited in Developments 
in the Law: Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1643, 1669 n.186 
(1990) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (noting that medical ethical standards 
HeinOnline -- 23 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 524 1999-2000
524 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 23 
Another potential way that the evolution in the application 
of the ethical integrity standard could be justified is to say that 
maintaining EIMP requires doctors to act in accordance with 
the contemporary norms of society as a whole. Because society 
had reached a consensus in favor of greater patient autonomy, 
the argument would go, it would contravene the ethical 
integrity of the profession to resist patients whose requests 
were within the limits of that consensus. 
This argument ignores the fact that no such broad societal 
consensus exists. Second, tying the ethical integrity of the 
profession to whatever society believes on that day robs the 
medical ethical establishment of purpose. This is dangerous 
given that we want doctors to contemplate specially the ethical 
implications of their work,106 even if society does not trust them 
to have the last word. Third, in actual practice the courts in 
these cases generally defer to the medical ethical establishment, 
not to what society or the legislature thinks. 
The ethical integrity of the medical profession cannot 
function as a part of the state interest if it is tied solely to the 
ethical dictates of society or, alternately, tied to the ethical 
dictates of the medical establishment. The ethical integrity test 
should reflect the Societal Goal: the general public interest in 
having an ethical medical profession, as opposed to merely 
having doctors conform to a particular code of ethics. 
The Appropriate Treatment Goal does little to consider the 
II social meaning of medical decisions,"107 or to safeguard the 
ethical integrity of the profession. To the extent that the 
Appropriate Treatment Goal does protect the profession, it 
does so redundantly; institutional mechanisms ensure that 
doctors follow the ethical dictates of the profession, and 
democratic ones (legislation and regulation) ensure that 
doctors follow the ethical dictates of society. 
further medicine's monopoly). Well-known examples include the Nazi doctors 
discussed previously; forced sterilizations of prisoners and the mentally retarded 
in the United States and Europe; and the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiments 
on African-Americans. For an interesting analogy between deferring to the 
medical profession and deferring to administrative agencies, see David L. Katz, 
Note, Perry v. Louisiana: Medical Ethics on Death Row: Is Judicial Intervention 
Warranted?, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL E1HICS 707, 723 (1991). 
106. See generally Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D., Patient and Physician Autonomy: 
Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. 
REAL1H L. & POL'y 47, 66-68 (1993) (asserting need for medical ethical 
establishment existing independently of social convention). 
107. Developments in the Law, supra note 105, at 1669. 
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Unfortunately, courts usually employ the Appropriate 
Treatment Goal in considering end-of-life care cases. If EIMP 
only means that doctors ought not let people die, given that 
such death is not always objectionable, EIMP will usually be 
irrelevant. Even when this version of EIMP was weightier, the 
state interest in life was generally sufficient to trump the 
individual's right. So, in its most typical applications, EIMP is 
generally irrelevant to the law. Because the Societal Goal better 
furthers these relevant considerations, courts should take it-
and through it EIMP -more seriously. lOS 
B. Individual Conscience 
A second interpretation of the ethical integrity test has been 
used by a handful of courts. This interpretation focuses on the 
interest of doctors in not acting contrary to their personal 
ethical standards: the Individual Conscience Goa1.I09 This goal 
is distinct from the Liability Goal and the Full/Appropriate 
Treatment Goal, but it relates tangentially to the Societal Goal 
insofar as it is in society's interestllO for doctors to practice in 
ethically comfortable situations. Doctors may be, to borrow 
from the parlance of law and economics, the "least-cost 
avoiders" in terms of ethics. 
A leading case applying this goal is Brophy v. New England 
Sinai Hospital,111 which held that "so long as we decline to force 
the hospital to participate ... there is no violation of the ethical 
integrity of the medical profession.,,112 Importantly, Brophy 
discussed the Individual Conscience Goal both as the hospital's 
interest and the state's, though future cases mechanically 
applying the ethical integrity test have not always bifurcated 
the treatment of Individual Conscience in this way.1l3 
108. See infra Part VII. 
109. For a reading of EIMP as coextensive with the Individual Conscience Goal, 
coupled with an aggressive defense of the Goal in the face of judicial activism, see 
James J. Murphy, Comment, Beyond Autonomy: Judicial Restraint and the Legal Limits 
Necessary to Uphold the Hippocratic Tradition and Preserve the Ethical Integrity of the 
Medical Profession, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALlHL. & PoL'Y 451 (1993). 
110. Society's interest is not inherently incompatible with being part of a state 
interest because the state is supposed to represent the interests of unrepresented 
third parties. 
111. 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986). 
112 Id. at 638. 
113. See id. at 627-39; In re Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1270 & n.17 (Mass. 1992); see 
also In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1246 & n.13 (D.c. 1990). The A.C. case is 
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Such protection of the hospital's and the state's interests 
furthers a worthy goal, but it has no basis in the Saikewicz 
definition of EIMP. In Saikewicz's application of the ethical 
integrity test, the court did look to the opinions of the 
attending physicians, but it did not treat these decisions as 
matters of personal conscience. Individual Conscience 
arguably could function as a moral version of the Liability 
Goal, but no court decisions explicitly draw this connection. If 
courts believe that the state has an interest in protecting the 
interests of doctors and hospitals, they should say so in 
appropriate language (e.g., "the state has an interest in 
maintaining the ethical autonomy and integrity of individual 
members of the medical profession"), not by adapting the ill-
fitting language of Saikewicz and its progeny without 
explanation. 
In addition, courts that cite the Individual Conscience Goal 
as a purpose of EIMP have not used it to prevent the carrying 
out of patients' wishes. Here, too, the ethical integrity of the 
medical profession is not really safeguarded from a societal or 
a professional standpoint. These courts refuse to force 
individual doctors to act against their principles, but so long as 
some doctor somewhere is carrying out the patient's wishes, 
the impact on the ethical integrity of the profession remains. 
The most problematic cases are those where the court 
recognizes the doctor's interest in acting in accordance with his 
conscience, but forces the doctor to comply if within a certain 
amount of time he cannot find another institution willing to 
perform the procedure.114 In other words, if a procedure is 
troubling ethically, but only minimally, so that another doctor 
can easily be found to perform it, the original doctor can opt 
out. But for the procedures that are so ethically problematic 
that no other willing doctors can be found, the original doctor 
is forced to act. This leads to the ironic result that an 
particularly troubling; it dealt with a terminally ill pregnant woman forced 
against her will to have a cesarean section. The doctor's right to choose was 
vindicated, while the woman's was on the losing side. The court's treatment of 
EIMP is strikingly ironic. 
114. See, e.g., Elbaum v. Grace Plaza, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1989); see also Kathleen M. Boozang, Death Wish: Resuscitating Self-Determination 
for the Critically 1//, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 23, 50-51 & n.146 (1993) (citing such cases, 
including some that did not cite the EIMP interest); cf. MD. CODE ANN., HEAL1H-
GEN. § 5-611 (protecting physician's right not to perform ethically guestionable 
procedures, but limiting right if willing care provider cannot be found). 
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individual doctor's right to follow her conscience is left 
unprotected in precisely those cases where that right is most 
seriously implicated. 
None of this is to say that the rights of individual doctors 
should not be protected, even at the cost of allowing for greater 
ethical division among doctors.ll5 Indeed, Part VII will address 
that very concern. The use of EIMP to provide such protection, 
however, both further obfuscates the Saikewicz standard and 
appears not to work anyway. 
C. Conclusions 
When Saikewicz introduced EIMP, it was unclear what the 
standard was supposed to mean. It was distilled from the 
Liability and Full Treatment Goals. The former goal was 
ignored in Saikewicz and by most of the courts applying it. The 
latter goal was dead on arrival because the strong deference 
given to the liberty interest in Saikewicz meant that Full 
Treatment was no longer always appropriate. 
What was left? Nothing, necessarily. Saikewicz, after all, 
culled state interests from old cases whose foundations it 
simultaneously tore down. For future courts, all that Saikewicz 
left of the state interest in EIMP was the need to ensure that 
current institutional medical ethics were indeed consistent with 
the action to be taken in the case at hand. Yet, this concern 
would never really need to be balanced; a court would not 
order a procedure that was medically unethical, because no 
doctor would be available to perform it. This fact has been 
ignored by courts, which have "resolved" the issues in the 
cases before them "by mechanical reliance on [Saikewicz's] legal 
doctrine," in ironic disregard of that case's warning.ll6 
The only room for conflict left by these courts is the interest 
of individual doctors in not violating their own consciences. 
Even if fulfilling a patient's request is consistent with medical 
115. This sort of division could be argued to have a negative impact on the 
ethical integrity of the profession, as it causes fragmentation and prevents 
accountability to a unitary ethical authority, something that patients may rely 
upon. On the other hand, society may also value a profession composed of 
people who are indiVidually accountable, provided that their individualism is 
communicated to the patient, who can then get an "second ethical opinion." As a 
practical matter, though, these ethical opinions are typically not sought by 
patients, but by doctors. 
116. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 422. 
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ethics, individual doctors (who often bring these lawsuits to 
flout the patient's wishes,117 not just to avoid liability) might be 
unhappy about being required to refrain from performing a 
life-saving procedure. If the court already is balancing ethics, 
and these uneasy doctors are before the court, it is fairly simple 
to consider the Individual Conscience Goal as part of the 
ethical integrity test. 
The Societal Goal has not been analyzed under the EIMP test 
as applied. Neither the Saikewicz court nor any subsequent 
court has made a systematic effort to fulfill this goal along with 
the personal interest in liberty and the state interest in 
preserving life. As with most balancing tests, the court views 
its role as weighing the concerns of each party. This role makes 
sense when the court must balance the mutually incompatible 
interests of a patient in death and the state in life. It makes less 
sense when medical ethics issues are implicated. Mter Part V 
examines how the Societal Goal has been used and ignored in 
related areas of the law, Part VII looks at ways to maximize the 
sum of life, liberty, and the interests expressed in the Societal 
and Individual Conscience Goals. 
V. ANALOGUF5: ABORTION, AssISTED SUICIDE, AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY 
Strikingly, while EIMP has been mechanically and blankly 
applied in treatment-refusal cases, it has received relatively 
little attention in other cases that raise even more difficult 
questions about the medical profession's proper ethical role.118 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Glucksberg 
likely means an end to this trend and an expansion of EIMP, 
with all of its flaws, into other highly charged areas at the 
margins of medical ethics.ll9 
117. See supra note 102. 
118. Cj Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 676 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (ignoring 
EIMP in "wrongful birth" case and noting that the Saikewicz factors are 
"consider[ed] to be inapplicable or shunt[ed] aside" in similar cases). 
119. Despite the danger of importing the flawed EIMP jurisprudence into other 
areas, at least one scholar who sees the potential for EIMP's expansion also views 
EIMP more or less in the context of the Societal Goal. See Jill R. Radloff, Note, 
Partial-Birth Infanticide: An Alternate Legal and Medical Route to Banning Partial-Birth 
Procedures, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1555, 1582-83 (1999) (applying GlucksberglSaikewicz 
analysis to "partial-birth infanticide" paradigm, and stating that "because the 
performance of both physician-assisted suicide and partial-birth infanticide may 
lead the public to question the medical profession's ethics and integrity, a state 
HeinOnline -- 23 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 529 1999-2000
No.2] Death, Ethics, and the State 529 
This Part examines abortion, assisted suicide, and death 
penalty cases in which EIMP or something resembling it has 
been applied.12O The attention (or lack thereof) given to EIMP 
is an accidental result of our common-law system's reliance on 
precedent. Treatment-refusal cases often look to Saikewicz and 
cite its language. However, EIMP has largely been ignored in 
these other areas because cases of similar or greater weight in 
these fields (for example, Roe v. Wade121 in abortion law) do not 
contain such language. Nevertheless, even when boiled down 
to its simplest and weakest formulation-lithe job of doctors is 
(usually) to heal" -the interest in maintaining the ethical 
integrity of the medical profession is deeply important to a 
correct resolution of cases in these other areas. Ideally, with 
Glucksberg as precedent, EIMP will be considered more 
carefully than it was in the cases discussed below.l22 
A. Abortion 
As discussed previously, an early, important abortion case, 
Poe v. Menghini mentioned the II ethics and integrity of the 
medical profession," in the context of preventing a state from 
interposing the judgment of an outside medical panel in the 
decision to perform an abortion.l23 Significantly though, Poe 
does not assert a state interest in EIMP. Subsequent landmark 
abortion cases like Roe v. Wade dealt at great length with 
medical ethics, but these cases contained no strong statement of 
a state interest in maintaining EIMP and turned instead on the 
balancing of the interests of the mother, the fetus, and the 
has an interest in preventing the erosion of public faith in the medical 
community"). 
120. The issues discussed here are those that have generated significant case 
law in the past, but as technological capabilities continue to skyrocket in the next 
decade, innumerable other medical/ethical/legal issues will likely arise in which 
EIMP will be a factor (and likely will be mishandled-i.e., treated as the 
Appropriate Treatment Goal-as it has been to date). See, e.g., Michelle L. 
Brenwald & Kay Redeker, Note, A Primer on Posthumous Conception and Related 
Issues of Assisted Reproduction, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 599, 612 n.49 (1999) ("[T]he 
United States Supreme Court will likely give deference to physicians and their 
ethical guidelines if a posthumous conception issue ever arose, as '[t]he State also 
has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession."') 
(quoting Glucksberg v. Washington, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997». 
121. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
122. The Glucksberg Court did improve somewhat on EIMP's flawed 
interpretive history. See infra Section VI.A. 
123. 339 F. Supp. 986, 995 (D. Kan. 1972). 
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state.124 
The language of Saikewicz did appear in one abortion case: 
Moe v. Secretary of Administration and Finance.m This was a 
Massachusetts case~ which likely explains why Saikewicz was 
on the judges' precedential radar screens.126 In Moe, three 
women challenged a Medicaid restriction that limited funding 
abortions to cases in which the mother's life was in danger. All 
three women had medically indicated abortions, but their lives 
were not endangered per se. The court held in their favor, and 
looked to Saikewicz and one of its descendants127 for help in 
assessing the state interest: II Although we do not regard it as 
decisive, we note that placing physicians in the position of 
choosing between their livelihood and the preservation of the 
health of a patient for whom abortion is a medical necessity 
cannot be thought to foster the ethical integrity of the 
profession."l28 
Avoiding this dilemma for the physician resembles the 
Liability Goal, although the liability here was merely 
administrative, rather than civil or criminal. The opinion 
mentions nothing resembling the Societal or Full Treatment 
Goals, both because the interests in life and privacy 
outweighed EIMP and because it was settled by Roe v. Wade 
that, as far as lower courts were concerned, abortion was not 
inconsistent with medical ethics. Also, because Moe mainly 
concerned public funding rather than, for example, the ethics 
of a new abortion procedure, the ethical integrity of the 
profession as developed in Saikewicz could not be fully 
implicated in any meaningful way. 
Should not the ethical integrity of the medical profession be 
of concern to judges deciding cases at the margins of the 
abortion debate? While Roe dealt at length with medical ethics, 
subsequent cases such as Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services129 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey130 did not. They 
124. See generally Roe, 410 U.S. at 129-66. 
125. 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981). 
126. See id. at 403 ("Rather than mechanically accepting [Roe v. Wade's] result, 
however, we prefer to test these enactments [restricting abortions] bX the 
balancing principles which we have developed in our own recent decisions.' ). 
127. Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979). 
128. Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 404 n.22. 
129. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
130. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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certainly did not address EIMP. However, more than a few 
doctors have been murdered by people who felt that abortion 
was inconsistent with the proper ethical role of doctors in our 
sOciety.l3l While one might argue that abortion cases concern 
titanic interests in life and privacy, leaving EIMP with little 
weight in the balance, recent cases involving parental 
consent,132 partial-birth abortions/33 and other such important 
issues on the ethical margins clearly implicate EIMP. 
Furthermore, the unlikelihood that EIMP would ever be 
dispositive does not mean that it is unimportant to consider in 
constructing workable solutions to these knotty issues. Mer 
all, abortion cases involve the interests of the would-be 
mothers, the unborn, would-be fathers, would-be 
grandparents, abortion providers, the state, and others; there is 
ample room for the consideration of, and respect for, a 
multitude of varying interests (Roe is a classic, if obsolete, 
example). Here, then, is a promising candidate for an approach 
to the state interest in ethical integrity that seeks to maximize 
its sum with other interests, rather than merely weighing and 
discarding it if it is on the light side of the scale. 
B. Assisted Suicide 
In the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Compassion in Dying 
v. Washington/34 reversed by the Supreme Court in Glucksberg, 
Judge Reinhardt's opinion for the court predicted that, just as 
the legalization of abortion had not negatively impacted the 
ethical standing of the medical profession (a debatable 
proposition), the legalization of physician-assisted suicide 
would similarly have no detrimental effect on the integrity of 
the medical profession.135 According to Judge Reinhardt's 
somewhat bold approach, EIMP dictates 11 prohibiting 
physicians from engaging in conduct that is at odds with their 
role as healers," and is compromised not by assisted suicide, 
131. See Shelby A.D. Moore, Doing Another's Bidding Under a Theory of Defense of 
Others: Shall We Protect the Unborn with Murder?, 86 Ky. L.J. 257, 263 (1998). 
132. In contrast to abortion cases, minors in treatment-refusal cases are 
generally not given their own voice, but instead have the state represent their 
interests. See supra note 100. 
133. See Radloff, supra note 119. 
134. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Glucksberg v. Washington, 521 
U.S. 702 (1997). 
135. See id. at 829-30. 
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but by statutes that forbid the practice.136 Thus, for Judge 
Reinhardt, society's interest is served by having compassionate 
doctors. 
Whether or not one agrees with Reinhardt's analysis, it 
brings to the forefront important questions that should be 
considered in the other cases discussed in this Article. What 
are the effects on the medical profession's ethical integrity from 
physicians assisting in suicides, letting otherwise healthy 
patients refuse life-saving treatment, performing certain types 
of abortion, or assisting in the execution of convicted 
murderers? Perhaps even more important is the question of 
how we as a society and a legal system are supposed to answer 
that question. 
Part VII offers some possible answers. Judge Reinhardt's 
answers are in his opinion, and unlike all of the other major 
assisted suicide cases, the opinion discusses how to meet the 
Societal Goal.137 A faithful reading of Saikewicz's treatment of 
136. Id. at 827. The dissent not unexpectedly disagreed with this assessment, 
claiming that assisted suicide contravenes medical ethics. Id. at 855 (Beezer, J., 
dissenting). Contrast the majority opinion in Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790 (9th 
Cir. 1996), to the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Kevorkian, 
527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), which did not even mention the ethical integrity of 
the medical profession in the majority opinion, even though its more conservative 
approach to the assisted suicide question certainly could have benefited from 
such an analysis. 
137. Within the context of physician-assisted suicide, some have called for the 
same sort of bland application seen in the Appropriate Treatment Goal cases, 
looking only to the contemporary state of medical ethics (which are usually cited 
with artificial clarity) and in any event looking mostly to the strong individual 
interest for a basis of decision. See, e.g., Joan W. Dalbey Donahue, Note, Physician-
Assisted Suicide: A "Right" Reservedfor Only the Competent?, 19 VT. L. REv. 795, 806-
11 (1995). 
I did find one other court that has looked at EIMP with (relative) subtlety: the 
Circuit Court of Oakland County, Michigan, where Dr. Jack Kevorkian has been 
tried several times. Following is an excerpt from a decision accompanying an 
injunction against Kevorkian: 
The final State interest which is implicated is the maintenance of the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession. There is substantial evidence 
on the record in this case as to the unacceptability of Dr. Kevorkian's 
proposed practice. Prevailing medical ethical practice rejects physician-
assisted suicide; the goal of causing death is contrary to the goal of 
medicine to promote health and life. Doctors testified as to the threat of 
this practice to the existence of the medical profession in view of the potential 
for error or abuse and the lack of capability of a precise measurement of 
pain and incurability, consent and voluntariness. The Court finds that 
the proposed practice of physician-assisted suicide is outside of the realm 
of acceptable medical practice and threatens the ethical integrity of the 
medical profession. 
Honorable Alice Gilbert, The Legal Response to Assisted Suicide, 20 OHIO N.U. L. 
HeinOnline -- 23 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 533 1999-2000
No.2] Death, Ethics, and the State 533 
EIMP indicates that Judge Reinhardt is not in accord with that 
case and its progeny, and yet (ironically, considering his 
activist, non-textual approach) Judge Reinhardt is the first 
judge to attempt to do justice to the plain meaning of EIMP. 
Furthermore, however Saikewicz is interpreted, EIMP is an 
important consideration ignored by too many courts who 
apply the standard as if all that matters is preventing doctors 
from helping people die, except in a few well-defined 
situations. These courts have implied that if medical ethics 
permit a death, the ethical integrity of the medical profession 
remains unharmed. By applying EIMP in a case where not 
permitting a death is purportedly a threat to the ethical 
integrity of the profession, the Ninth Circuit has shown that 
ethical integrity is more complex than "preserving life with a 
few exceptions." Regardless of whether Judge Reinhardt 
answered the question correctly (I would argue that he did 
not), he was asking the question suggested by the plain 
meaning of EIMP -the Societal Goal question. 
In the case of assisted suicide, there is no decisive public or 
medical consensus on the proper role for doctors, which makes 
it more urgent to determine the correct outcome by considering 
the implications for the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession.138 Not everyone agrees with Judge Reinhardt; 
many commentators worry that physician-assisted suicide 
would undermine the bond of trust between doctors and their 
patients.139 The ethical integrity of the medical profession is 
"damned if it does and damned if it doesn't." Perhaps EIMP 
requires a single standard; or a legislative statement (more on 
this later); or the maximization of patient and doctor choice. 
The point is that looking to and arguing over the dictates of the 
medical ethical establishment will do little to tell us what effect 
a given course of decision will have on the ethical integrity of 
REv. 673, 706-07 (1994) (reprinting decision in People v. Kevorkian, Case No. 90-
390963-AZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 5, 1991» (emphasis added). While Gilbert initially 
focuses on a standard application of standard medical ethics, she elaborates by 
including such issues as potential for error or abuse, consent and voluntariness, 
issues which provide a more nuanced view of EIMP than just whether or not it is 
socially acceptable for doctors to help people die. 
I should disclose that, COincidentally, I worked for Judge Gilbert in the summer 
of 1995, but I did not do work related to the issues discussed here. 
138. See Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right To Die with Assistance, 105 
HARv. L. REv. 2021, 2035 (1992). 
139. See, e.g., Neil Milton, Lessons from Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 11 IssUFS 
1. & MEn. 123, 129 (1995). 
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the profession. The contentious nature of the assisted suicide 
debate shows that Saikewicz's version of the EIMP state interest, 
as applied to this issue, is nearly useless. 
C. The Death Penalty 
Finally, death penalty cases implicate EIMP, but again with 
less vigor than treatment-refusal cases. There are two separate 
issues here. First, many states require that a doctor be present 
at executions (perhaps to lend an aura of clinical precision and 
faux compassion to the killing of prisoners) but this role is 
incompatible with the doctor's usual societal role. Second, 
because it is generally unconstitutional to execute medically 
incompetent prisoners, an ethical dilemma is inherent in 
treating psychotic death-row prisoners who will be killed as 
soon as they are cured (or at least drugged into stabilization). 
A handful of cases have recognized these dilemmas, and 
some have even evaluated the effect of executing prisoners on 
the ethical integrity of the medical profession, but none have 
explicitly cast EIMP as an interest to be weighed or have made 
it a dispositive factor in the decision.14o Still, the courts in some 
of these cases have taken the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession seriously, even if they have not been able to fashion 
subtle results. This lack of subtlety exists because, as in 
abortion and treatment-refusal cases, the result is either life or 
death, and the court is unlikely to look much beyond those two 
weightiest of outcomes. 
In the seminal case of this genre, State v. Perry,141 the 
Louisiana Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to 
forcibly medicate psychotic prisoners just so that they could be 
executed.l42 While the focus was on the rights of the 
patient/ prisoner, the court duly noted that readying a patient 
for the slaughter "inherently conflicts with medical ethics."143 
The court cites this conflict only as evidence of societal 
standards of decency, not as an interest to be weighed in 
140. For discussion of these issues, see Katz, supra note 105, especially at 721; 
Rochelle Graff Salguero, Note, Medical Ethics and Competency to Be Executed, 96 
YALEL.J. 167, especially at183-86 (1986). 
141. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992). 
142 See id.; see also Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.c. 1993) (reaching similar 
conclusion on grounds of right to privacy, with current medical ethics (but not an 
interest in EIMP) "reinforc[ing)" the conclusion). 
143. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 769; see also Taylor, supra note 69, at 1063. 
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resolving the case. Indeed, medical ethics are opposed to the 
state interest here, not part of it. This subtlety was not 
recognized in any of the treatment-refusal cases, in which all 
the state-interest prongs have either been weighed against the 
patient's privacy interest or held not to matter, but have almost 
never been added to the patient's side of the scale.l44 The Perry 
court's placement of EIMP on the patient's side probably does 
not reflect any deep reflection on this subtle distinction 
between treatment refusal and the death penalty; more likely, it 
stems from the fact that EIMP is equated with life in both 
contexts, and in death penalty cases life is the patient's interest, 
not the state's. 
Later in the Perry opinion, medical ethics enters more 
directly into the prisoner's interest. Because doctors cannot be 
forced to contravene their professional ethical standards, the 
prisoner is left with no possibility of obtaining proper medical 
treatment. Attempting to force treatment ironically leads to 
deprivation of treatment, and contravenes the prisoner's 
interest.145 . 
Still later, the Perry court comes very close to expressing the 
Societal Goal (its mere evaluation of the ethical consistency of 
treatment having only expressed the Appropriate Treatment 
Goal). While it does not appear to factor into the ultimate 
weighing of interests, the court notes in some detail that forced 
treatment in this case denigrates the social interest in keeping 
medical care as an "unambiguously beneficent healing art."146 
This language of "interests," however, is mere dicta. The so-
called interest leads only to the conclusion that forced 
treatment in this case should be classified as part of the process 
of executing the prisoner, not as medical treatment.147 No real 
societal interest in ethical integrity is weighed explicitly against 
the state interest in executing the prisoner. No personal 
interest of the doctors weighs into the calculus at all. 
The Delaware case of State v. Gattis148 is less promising than 
Perry in its consideration of the ethics of the medical 
profession. Gattis, facing execution, claimed that Delaware's 
144. See supra note 99. 
145. See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 752. 
146. [d. at 753 (citing Katz, supra note 105, at 724). 
147. Seeid. 
148. No. IN90-05-1017, 1995 WL 562254 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 1995). 
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lethal injection provision violated constitutional standards of 
decency because it required a doctor's participation, in 
violation of medical ethics.149 The court rejected this claim for 
procedural reasons, but it added that Gattis would not have 
won anyway, because contravention of medical ethics did not 
necessarily render the death penalty morally or constitutionally 
impermissible.lso This holding missed the point of Gattis's 
claim, which was not that to kill him was unacceptable per se, 
but that to have a doctor present when doing so was 
unacceptable. The Gattis court thus missed a golden 
opportunity to at least comment on the implications for the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession of requiring doctors 
to participate in executions, especially given that members of 
the medical ethics establishment, such as the American Medical 
Association ("AMA"), proscribe it.l5l 
In the death penalty context, as in the assisted suicide and 
abortion contexts, the ethical integrity of the medical profession 
is implicated but not discussed. Furthermore, unlike the 
treatment-refusal cases, EIMP is not formally recognized, even 
superficially, as an interest to be weighed in determining 
whether the prisoner-patient should live or die. But, the fact 
that courts are willing to force death-row prisoners to receive 
treatment does not mean that courts should blithely force 
doctors to provide it. Nevertheless, even though the Individual 
Conscience Goal should be an important consideration in 
death-penalty and other prisoner forced-treatment cases, courts 
have completely slighted it. 
The interest of society in having doctors with ethical 
integrity is more complex than the narrow question of when 
doctors should be allowed to help people die. Decisions and 
procedures surrounding death can and should be shaped to 
minimize the damage to the integrity of the profession. 
149. See id. at *21. 
150. See id. 
151. The Gattis court cited State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994), for 
this proposition. The Deputy court had noted opposition by the AMA, the 
American Nurses Association, the American College of Physicians, and the 
American Public Health Association to participation in executions of prisoners, 
but it held that this opposition was not convincing evidence of contemporary 
standards of decency. See id. at 421. Yet, the claim in Deputy only extended to this 
question of decency, while the claim in Gattis directly concerned actual doctor 
participation. 
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Few, if any, of the EIMP cases actually look toward 
promoting the profession's ethical integrity; they instead focus 
on guarding against its infringement. These cases typically do 
so by deferring to contemporary medical ethics, a maneuver 
that does nothing to help safeguard EIMP. The final Part of 
this Article suggests simple ways in which the law may take 
EIMP seriously while protecting the individual rights of both 
patients and doctors. But first, Part VI discusses the most 
significant milestone in the history of EIMP: its discussion by 
the U.S. Supreme Court. 
VI. WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG 
Judge Reinhardt's opinion in Compassion in Dying, discussed 
above, was appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the 
Ninth Circuit. In doing so, the Supreme Court enshrined EIMP 
as a state interest in assisted suicide law. Despite not being 
bound by the precedents of lower courts, the Supreme Court 
adopted the language of EIMP with the same sense of 
automaticity that has characterized EIMP in lower courts. As a 
result, the Court's use of EIMP suffers from some of the same 
flaws described at length above. Encouragingly, however, the 
Court did move somewhat closer to the Societal Goal: using 
EIMP to protect the value to society of having ethical doctors. 
A. The Majority Opinion 
The majority in Glucksberg mentioned EIMP in its discussion 
of whether Washington's ban on assisted suicide was rationally 
related to legitimate government interests:152 
The State also has an interest in protecting the integrity and 
ethics of the medical profession. . .. [T]he American Medical 
Association, like many other medical and physicians' 
groups, has concluded that I/[p]hysician-assisted suicide is 
fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as 
healer.1/ And physician-assisted suicide could, it is argued, 
undermine the trust that is essential to the doctor-patient 
relationship by blurring the time-honored line between 
healing and harrning.153 
Superficially, the biggest difference in the Court's use of EIMP 
152. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 n.20 (1997). 
153. ld. at 731 (emphasis added) (second alteration in original) (citation 
omitted) (quoting American Medical Association, Code of Ethics § 2.211 (1994». 
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here (besides a slight shift in phrasing) is that the state interest 
is on the winning side for a change. But, while results are 
important, the Court's method of analysis has even more 
significance. 
The Court noted that it was lifting its catalog of state 
interests from the lower court and the parties' briefs.l54 Unlike 
the Saikewicz court, the U.S. Supreme Court did not purport to 
make a definitive list of state interests; rather, it surveyed the 
interests cited by the parties and acted only to determine 
whether or not those interests were legitimate and rationally 
related to the state's actions. ISS 
This distinction does not, however, let the Court completely 
off the hook. The readiness of courts in jurisdictions outside of 
Massachusetts to adopt the Saikewicz state-interest test 
verbatim, without analysis, has already been shown.156 It 
seems likely that the U.S. Supreme Court's citation of EIMP 
will carry even more weight with these courts, since its rulings 
(unlike those of the Massachusetts SJC) are binding on them.1S7 
Unfortunately, just as courts around the country have recited 
Saikewicz's list of state interests without adjustment or analysis, 
these same courts are likely to regurgitate the Glucksberg 
analysis rather than deconstruct it and make optimal use of it. 
Moreover, even though the Court only mentioned EIMP 
because the parties used it, it still has a responsibility to give a 
reasoned explanation of what EIMP means and how it should 
be applied. As quoted above, however, the Court notes only 
that the AMA believes that assisted suicide is incompatible 
with the physician's role as healer, and that assisted suicide 
therefore threatens the doctor-patient relationship. ISS 
154. See id. at 728. 
155. See id. at 728 n.21. 
156. See supra Part IV. 
157. Lower courts around the country thus may also be more likely to apply the 
analysis in Glucksberg to contexts outside assisted suicide than they were to apply 
Saikewicz outside of treatment refusal cases. Cj. supra note 127 and accompanying 
text. 
158. The Supreme Court's citation to and reliance on the AMA raises the 
interesting issue-one which this Article leaves for another day-of what exactly 
constitutes the "medical ethical establishment." In this Article I have often 
mentioned the AMA and the "medical ethical establishment" almost 
interchangeably. This is an oversimplification. Yet, it is true that the AMA, its 
Journal, and its well-developed Code of Ethics loom large in any discussion of 
what is ethically acceptable. They certainly do in Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 424 
(relying on three JAMA articles as basis of "current state of medical ethics"), and 
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It would probably be unreasonable to expect the Court to 
have embarked on an extensive analysis of the origins and 
meaning of EIMP. Nevertheless, it would not have been too 
difficult for the Supreme Court, which has the last word on the 
meaning of EIMP, to reflect carefully on what it was 
interpreting EIMP to mean, and on the implications of that 
choice. 
Fortunately, however, the Court seems to have gotten it 
right, albeit briefly and cursorily. The Court did not merely 
cite the AMA Code as evidence of the medical ethical 
consensus and conclude that, because the profession does not 
accept assisted suicide, the practice necessarily compromises 
EIMP. Certainly the Court does imply this,159 but it continues 
by noting that the "the societal risks of involving physicians in 
medical interventions to cause patients' deaths is too great." 160 
In particular the Court was concerned that physician-assisted 
suicide would "undermine the trust that is essential to the 
doctor-patient relationship by blurring the time-honored line 
between healing and harming.,,161 
Admittedly, the Court's discussion is short and relies heavily 
on the AMA and the congressional testimony of Dr. Leon Kass. 
But like Judge Reinhardt below, the Court has done something 
unusual in the annals of EIMP: it has included in its application 
of EIMP a discussion of why assisted suicide creates a problem 
for society vis-a.-vis its need for doctors to maintain ethical 
integrity. Instead of using the same threadbare logic of so 
many previous courts, the Glucksberg Court added some detail. 
The point should not be overstated. The Court's holding 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731 (relying heavily on AMA). 
159. Specifically, the Court noted that the AMA had stated in its amicus brief 
that "[p]hysician assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the 
physician's role as healer." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731 (quoting American Medical 
Association, Code oJEthics § 2.211 (1994». 
By contrast, the Florida Supreme Court, in a case decided only a few weeks 
later, goes no further than a recitation of the medical ethical establishment's 
objection to assisted suicide. The case, Krischer v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97, 103-04 
(Fla. 1997), essentially uses the same sources and reaches the same result as the 
Glucksberg Court regarding EIMP, but it does not rely on Glucksberg for its 
conclusions. 
160. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731 (citation omitted) (quoting Council on Ethical 
and Judicial Affairs, Decisions Near the End oj Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2233 (1992». 
161. ld. (citing Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on the Constitution oj the House Committee on the Judiciary, l04th Cong., 355-56 
(1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass) ("The patient's trust in the doctor's whole 
hearted devotion to his best interests will be hard to sustain."». 
HeinOnline -- 23 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 540 1999-2000
540 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 23 
amounted to little more than an application of the Appropriate 
Treatment Goal, but with a conclusion that this "treatment" 
was not appropriate. The Court also did not state specifically 
that the real meaning of EIMP is the Societal Goal. Perhaps 
most significantly, the Court did not really engage in a 
discussion of medical ethics, or of the best way for society to 
define it in these cases. Finally, the Individual Conscience Goal 
is nowhere to be found, but its absence is no particular surprise 
because the Court's decision does not force doctors to act.162 
Nevertheless, in its discussion of the dangers of 
inappropriate treatment, the Court did more than any court 
before it to re-focus the EIMP discussion on the value to society 
of having doctors conform to a standard of ethics. That said, 
Justice Stevens's concurrence highlights the deficiencies of the 
Court's approach and underscores the need for the more 
nuanced approach outlined in this Article. 
B. Justice Stevens's Concurrence 
Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's assessment of 
EIMP, phrasing it somewhat differently, but he agreed that it 
was part of the equation: 
The final major interest asserted by the State is its interest in 
preserving the traditional integrity of the medical profession. The 
fear is that a rule permitting physicians to assist in suicide is 
inconsistent with the perception that they serve their 
patients solely as healers. But for some patients, it would be 
a physician's refusal to dispense medication to ease their 
suffering and make their death tolerable and dignified that 
would be inconsistent with the healing role. . . . 
Furthermore, because physicians are already involved in 
making decisions that hasten the death of terminally ill 
patients-through termination of life support, withholding 
of medical treatment, and terminal sedation-there is in fact 
significant tension between the traditional view of the 
physician's role and the actual practice in a growing number 
of cases.163 
162. To the extent that individual conscience requires some doctors to assist in 
suicide, of course, the Court's decision does implicate this Goal. By maintaining 
the status quo, though, the Court does nothing to prevent the actions of doctors 
who, for centuries, have discreetly helped their patients die. See Stephanie 
Graboyes-Russo, Too Costly to Live: The Moral Hazards of a Decision in Washington 
v. GlucksbergandVacco v. Quill, 51 U. MlAMIL. REv. 907, 913-14 (1997). 
163. Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 748-49 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added) 
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Justice Stevens's point is similar to that of Judge Reinhardt:l64 
medical ethics are not so simple that courts can say that 
assisted suicide will always find itself on the wrong side of 
EIMP. Justice Stevens also challenged the Court's facile 
assumption that the role of physician as healer can feasibly be 
maintained as an absolute. He concludes this section of his 
concurrence by noting that, AMA Code aside, a majority of 
doctors support some form of helping terminally-ill patients 
die.l65 I have deliberately avoided taking sides on this matter 
in this Article. The point is that when courts honestly evaluate 
the effect on EIMP solely on the basis of the consensus of a 
medical ethical establishment, they are bound to find that no 
real consensus exists. Furthermore, even if there is a 
consensus, there is no guarantee that writing this consensus 
into law protects the state interest in EIMP. 
Finally, Justice Stevens's concurrence highlights one 
remaining deficiency in the majority's approach. Even though 
the Court discusses the implications for EIMP of assisted 
suicide in a way that suggests the Societal Goal, in the end the 
Court engages in balancing. It evaluates the effect of the 
procedure at issue, determines that it is incompatible with 
EIMP, and ends the discussion. Justice Stevens, however, 
suggests that the majority might have it wrong, and that future 
cases might require re-evaluation of the calculUS.166 I would 
suggest that an even better approach would be to avoid the 
balancing approach altogether; to avoid placing EIMP 
inexorably opposite from the personal privacy interest; and to 
avoid forgetting about EIMP in those cases when the 
individual interest wins. The best approach is to seek to 
maximize EIMP and thus protect society from a repeat of the 
"Nazi doctor" problem, by finding ways to protect EIMP even 
in those cases where the "state interests" are trumped by 
(citations omitted). Stevens concluded that other legitimate state interests might 
suffice even without the interest in preserving the medical professions integrity. 
164. Justice Stevens did not agree with Judge Reinhardt that the state interests 
in this case would always be outweighed by the personal privacy interest, but he 
disagreed with the majority's equally rigid conclusion that they never would be. 
Seeid. 
165. See id. at 749 n.12. 
166. Cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943, 948 (1987) (discussing efforts by some courts not just to establish 
balancing tests but to establish permanent assessments and calculations of the 
factors). 
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individual rights. 
C. Post-Script 
It is too early to say for sure how lower courts will treat the 
Glucksberg Court's use of EIMP. One judicial clue comes from 
the Illinois Court of Appeals. In In re Fetus Brown,167 decided 
on the last day of 1997, the court gave the most detailed and 
incisive treatment of EIMP since Saikewicz in the process of 
allowing a pregnant woman to refuse treatment that would 
have benefited her viable fetus. 
First the court noted the Supreme Court's approval of the 
tired old Saikewicz state~interest test: 
Generally courts consider four State interests-the 
preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection 
of third parties, and the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession-when deciding whether to override competent 
treatment decisions. Application of the President & Directors of 
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1006-07 (D.c. Cir. 
1964); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 
370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977). See also Compassion in Dying v. 
, State of Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding 
six state interests, cited with approval on writ of certiorari, 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2271-72 n.21 
(1997)).168 
When the court applied EIMP, the court explained it as 
follows: 
This interest seeks to protect the role of hospitals in fully 
caring for their patients as well as to promote the prevailing 
medical ethical standards. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426. 
Although some hospitals have sought judicial determination 
of their role in these matters, the American Medical 
Association Board of Trustees generally recommends that 
"[j]udicial intervention is inappropriate when a woman has 
made an informed refusal of a medical treatment designed 
to benefit her fetus." H. Cole, Legal Interventions During 
Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2603, 2670 (1990). Accordingly, this 
interest does not provide a definitive solution.169 
Admittedly, this discussion is not particularly expansive. It 
also does not draw upon the Supreme Court's use of EIMP in 
167. 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997). 
168. ld. at 402 (citations omitted). 
169. ld. at 403 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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Glucksberg, though this is understandable because the Court in 
that case made no effort to explain what EIMP means, and 
because this case does not involve an assisted suicide. 
Interestingly, the court in Brown uses the language of Full 
Treatment, not the watered-down language of Appropriate 
Treatment seen elsewhere. This usage is significant, because 
the court nevertheless allows a patient to refuse treatment and 
forbids doctors to care fully for either the mother or the fetus, 
both of whom would die without treatment.170 
Finally, as in most previous cases, the court determines the 
effect on EIMP by examining the medical ethical 
establishment's current consensus. In doing so, though, it 
explicitly states that EIMP requires this examination. Indeed, it 
says that the court's role in the EIMP process is to maintain the 
status quo, or "prevailing medical ethical standards."l71 The 
Illinois Court of Appeals moves EIMP even farther down the 
wrong path discussed in this Article, both by embracing the 
Full/ Appropriate Treatment Goal over the Societal Goal, and 
by deferring completely to the medical ethical establishment's 
view of what is appropriate. It does so, for the first time, with a 
citation to a Supreme Court opinion. Hopefully, this is not a 
harbinger of things to come. 
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: TAKING ETHICAL INTEGRITY 
SERIOUSLY 
So what should be done with the state interest in 
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession? 
What respect is due to an underexplained and underanalyzed 
precedent? Has it been so trivialized that it should be 
eliminated?l72 Should the entire list of state interests be 
overhauled and replaced with a "longer and more precise 
list"?l73 Or should EIMP be reasserted on firmer ground? It is 
my contention here that the latter is the best course of action, 
because the Societal Goal is a worthy one. I propose to address 
170. See id. at 399. In this case, the question happened to be moot because the 
doctors performed the transfusion against the mother's will. See id. at 400. 
171. ld. at 403. 
172 See Daniel R. Gordon, The Right to Die: Public Health Trust v. Wons, 7 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 40, 97-98 (1990). 
173. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 266 n.n (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App.1989). 
HeinOnline -- 23 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 544 1999-2000
544 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 23 
two issues here: first, achieving the Societal Goal-ensuring 
that our doctors are playing a proper ethical role-while still 
protecting a right to privacy and autonomy among patients; 
and second, carving out an area of ethical autonomy for 
doctors as well. 
On its face, Saikewicz's declaration of a state interest in 
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession 
would seem to answer the Societal Goal once and for all. That 
is, it would seem to say that as a society we have an interest in 
the ethical responsibility of our medical community. As seen 
above, however, the courts applying EIMP have deferred to the 
ethical dictates of the profession itself in determining the 
proper role of doctors. While the opinions of doctors are 
certainly valuable ones to consider, this approach does nothing 
to protect the Societal Goal in those instances where the 
medical profession is divided on the ethical implications of a 
practice, or, more dangerously, when the profession is 
generally in agreement, but it is wrong. 
Does society have an interest resembling the Full Treatment 
Goal in having a group of professionals who are committed to 
preserving life at all costs? Presumably not, given the trend 
over the past three decades in respecting patients' choices and 
in recognizing that heroic and extreme efforts at prolonging life 
are not always the most appropriate treatment. Nevertheless, 
might it not be worthwhile to remove doctors from these sorts 
of decisions; to let doctors remain as life-savers and leave the 
welcoming of death to some other branch of health-care 
institutions such as hospices? I do not purport to engage this 
question thoroughly here. I raise it only to assert the 
possibility that what is best for the patient is not necessarily 
what is best for the ethical integrity of the medical profession, 
but that potential alternatives may keep these two interests 
from working at cross-purposes. 
The best approach takes EIMP out of the state-interest 
balancing test and places it instead into an interest-
maximization test. Currently, courts examine contemporary 
medical ethics as part of the state interest that is weighed 
against the patient's liberty/privacy interest. When medical 
ethics support the patient's side, they are just written out of the 
equation. This is an artifact of the pre-Quinlan analysis in 
which life was on one side, death was on the other, the 
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"winner" would necessarily "take all," and the ethical integrity 
of the medical profession clearly was attached to the interest in 
life. Now that this is no longer the case, it might make sense to 
place EIMP on the patient's side, or, better yet, to take it off of 
the scales altogether.174 The problem with balancing tests is 
that they dictate the same result for cases that are close as for 
cases that are not. By maximizing the sum of interests, or 
maximizing them individually in some lexical ordering, courts 
could go further towards vindicating all interests 
simultaneously. 
In doing so, litigants and courts could begin looking for 
proper complete solutions rather than just proper outcomes. 
Instead of simply letting a patient discontinue treatment and 
forcing doctors to help, a court could first determine if 
treatment should be continued or not (looking to the other 
parts of the Saikewicz test, if it so chooses) and then, if treatment 
is to be discontinued, look for ways to do so that do not place 
the medical profession in problematic ethical postures. In areas 
like the death penalty, a solution could be to recognize that 
executions are not medical procedures, and forbid states to 
pretend that they are. In the context of treatment refusal or 
physician-assisted suicide, a solution might be simply making 
it clearer to doctors and patients well ahead of time what their 
rights are, and encouraging a wide social dialogue as to the 
correctness of these rights. In all cases, it might be sufficient 
just to use an Appropriate Treatment goal, measured with the 
same sort of ethical consistency analysis that most courts have 
used, but to define what is ethically appropriate based on the 
recommendations of a state medical ethics commission that is 
not monopolized by doctors.175 
174. Cf. Keith Shiner, Note, Medical Futility, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 803, 806 
(1996) (discussing patients' requests for futile treatment that doctors ethically do 
not wish to perform: "A 'turf battle' has now developed and some physicians ... 
believe that patient autonomy has intruded too far into physician integrity-both 
as a matter of professional judgment and professional ethics.") (footnote omitted). 
175. Some states currently have state medical licensing boards that are 
composed of members of the public as well as medical professionals. See, e.g., 
MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 333.17021 (West 1999) (establishing board comprising 
nineteen members, of whom eight are "public members"). If the state legislature 
mandated that a similar sort of board, rather than a random collection of tomes on 
medical ethics found in the courthouse library, were to be the source of courts' 
assessments of proper medical ethics, it would have moved closer to a democratic, 
systematic, and principled resolution of the Societal Goal. 
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These latter two solutions sound more statutory than 
judicial, but nothing prevents the legislature or an independent 
state commission from supplanting the courts as guardian of 
the medical profession's ethical integrity. Some states have 
attempted to do just that, though without mentioning EIMP 
per se.176 Those states that do mention EIMP explicitly have 
simply written the state interest in EIMP into statutes without 
bothering to explain what EIMP means.177 It is thus crucial to 
involve legislatures in the enterprise of taking ethical integrity 
more seriously by setting up institutions to protect it.178 What 
the courts and legislatures should do, then, is recognize that 
Saikewicz was right in asserting that we have an interest as a 
society in the ethical integrity of our doctors, but recognize 
further that Saikewicz and its progeny have done a poor job of 
protecting it. Furthermore, EIMP should be protected in all 
legal-medical contexts, not just those treatment-refusal cases 
that fortuitously follow Saikewicz. 
Unfortunately, even if society were to rely on legislative and 
democratic solutions, courts have already weakened the ethical 
standing of doctors. The lack of regard courts have given to 
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession has 
been evident in case after case in which the courts newly 
allowed people to die or be killed. I would defer to the 
uncertain vicissitudes of popular consensus, not to vindicate 
democracy, but to prevent courts from doing further damage. I 
do not purport personally to have either the definitive answer 
for how to maintain EIMP, or an effective mechanism for 
writing it into law, absent the participation of political bodies 
working through democratic processes. 
Currently, the state interest in EIMP has become a near 
176. Maryland and Virginia, for instance, have statutes that protect physicians 
from being forced to perform a procedure that the physician personally feels is 
ethically inappropriate. See MD. CODE ANN., REALm-GEN. § 5-611; VA. CODE 
ANN. § 54.1-2990. 
177. See. e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.102(1) (West 1997) (asserting in advance 
directive law state interests in life and ethical standards of medical profession); 
Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.055(1) (listing protecting ethical standards of medical 
profession as one purpose of life support regulation declaration); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 20-402 (listing Saikewicz prongs as state interest in cases dealing with the 
terminally ill). 
178. I would be more forceful in urging a role for the legislature, based on my 
personal beliefs about the proper role of the judiciary, but I have bowed in this 
Article to the fact that courts follow precedents, however ill-defined, and I have 
attempted to find the best possible way to repair one particular precedent. 
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nullity because courts have found a consensus on when it is 
ethically acceptable to allow a patient to discontinue treatment. 
This consensus ignores the complexity of the ethical integrity of 
the medical profession, the many angles from which it is 
subject to erosion, and the fact that there will always be cases 
that need to be addressed at the margins of consensus. The 
following are some specific questions that we must have our 
guarantors of medical ethics address: Are doctors healers, life-
savers, comforters, or some combination? What are the best 
ways to vindicate a patient's right to refuse treatment? 
(presumably, lawsuits such as those surveyed in this Article are 
a poor way, given their repetition.) What is the proper role, if 
any, of doctors in assisting suicide? What should the bounds of 
such participation be? Of performing abortions? Of attending 
executions? More abstractly, but no less threatening to the 
ethical integrity of the medical profeSSion, under what 
circumstances should patients be told of genetic abnormalities 
in themselves or in their children? When are anencephalics 
considered legally dead so that their organs may be 
harvested?179 What about assisted reproduction/so genetic 
manipulation, and cloning? The list is potentially endless, -and 
given the increasing speed with which medical technology is 
advancing, there is no time to lose in forming principled 
methods of determining safeguards for the ethical integrity of 
the medical profession that are independent of determinations 
of patients' rights in individual cases. 
In the meantime, courts should avoid the path they have 
taken since Saikewicz, in which they define ethics rather than 
apply them. The ethical integrity of the medical profession can 
be threatened just as much by the actions of courts in rewriting 
the rules of medical ethics as by the actions of doctors working 
along the margins of technology. While I call here for a 
democratic determination of what is ethically acceptable, I also 
believe that maintaining the status quo until there is such a 
determination is the best way to maintain EIMP. Absent 
179. See Lisa E. Hanger, The Legal, Ethical, and Medical Objections to Harvesting 
Organs from Anencephalic Infallts, 5 HEALTII MATRIX 347, 356-57 (1995) (arguing 
that harvesting organs from anencephalic infants would harm the ethical integrity 
of the medical profession). 
180. See supra note 120. 
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constitutional considerations,18l a court has no reason to push a 
shift in medical ethics. If a court suddenly and newly allows 
doctors to, say, assist in suicides, preside at executions, or clone 
a sheep, it stacks the deck. If the court maintains the status 
quo, it gives the democratic machinery a chance to resolve the 
question itself. The ethical integrity of the medical profession 
rests on defining ethics by true societal consensus, not judicial 
fiat. 
Finally, courts are an immediate threat to the ethical integrity 
of the medical profession when they force medical practitioners 
to perform (or not perform) procedures based on a view of 
contemporary ethics that those doctors do not share. If doctors 
stop objecting, society has a problem. Even though society 
may not want to leave medical ethics completely in the hands 
of doctors, neither does it want doctors left out of the dialogue 
and placed at the mercy of the courts' predilections. The 
immediacy of this threat to the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession is apparent from those troublesome cases in which 
doctors object but must nevertheless obey courtS.182 
Separate, but still significant (indeed, perhaps more so) is the 
effect that forcing doctors to act has on the individual doctors 
themselves. The title of one law review article on the topic 
sums this up well: I Have a Conscience Too: The Plight of Medical 
Personnel Confronting the Right to Die.183 In other contexts, like 
forced sterilization and abortion, federal legislation specificall~ 
protects the rights of medical professionals to not participate.l 
It is worth debating the extension of these sorts of protections 
to medical professionals in the treatment-refusal or assisted-
181. The Ashwander doctrine suggests that courts should avoid these 
constitutional considerations. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing canon of avoiding constitutional questions 
that are not necessary to decide the case). These kinds of cases present a highly 
charged example of why the Constitution should be left out of moral, legislative 
decisions: a failure to do so enshrines morally questionable results as being 
compelled by higher law. 
182 See supra note 114. 
183. Irene Prior Loftus, 65 NOlRE DAME 1. REv. 699 (1990). 
184. See id. at 721. An interesting and fast-growing analog to forced 
sterilization is the chemical castration of criminal sex offenders; several states 
have considered allowing physicians to refuse to perform the procedure, and at 
least one state has written such an opt-out provision into its chemical castration 
law. See Robert D. Miller, Forced Administration o/Sex-Drive Reducing Medications to 
Sex Offinders: Treatment or Punishment?, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'y, & 1. 175, 196 
(1998). 
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suicide contexts/85 at least with the goal of spurring greater 
awareness and notice of medical ethical standards and options 
available to patients and to doctors. 
Whether our intent is to aid further in maintaining the ethical 
integrity of the medical profession, or to vindicate the rights of 
medical practitioners, the solution is the same. As in the 
previous section, the answer is to maximize, not balance. 
Instead of determining that the patient's right trumps the 
doctor's, and then leaving the doctor out in the cold, courts can 
tailor their rulings to vindicate both sets of rights. Some courts, 
though not all, have done thiS.186 
Obviously, these suggestions are ambitious ones. They 
would require a fairly radical departure from the spirit (though 
not the letter) of Saikewicz as it has been interpreted, and they 
would also require action by legislatures that have little 
immediate pressure being placed on them. Still, the language 
of Saikewicz and its progeny give space for courts to assert the 
Societal Goal, and the U.S. Supreme Court in Glucksberg took a 
tentative step in that direction. The ethical integrity of the 
medical profession is important, and courts and legislatures 
have shown some interest in protecting it. They can do it 
better. 
VITI. CONCLUSION 
When Saikewicz established a state interest in maintaining the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession, observers might 
have thought that EIMP would be an important factor as 
American courts moved through the tangled ethical issues that 
come with modem medicine. This belief might have seemed 
(superficially) vindicated by the inclusion of EIMP language by 
the Supreme Court in Glucksberg. But in reality, the effective 
use of the EIMP standard was over before it even started. 
Courts have construed medical ethics as supporting whatever 
outcome they would have reached anyway, and while 
considerations of ethics might have informed these decisions, 
there has been no case in which the consideration of the ethical 
185. See Boozang, supra note 114, at 50 n.l44 (citing states in which medical 
professionals have such protection in the context of the withdrawal of treatment). 
186. See id. at 50-51 & nn.144-46 (citing cases in which courts have allowed 
doctors to opt out, but also citing cases in which courts have not). 
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integrity of the profession made any difference in the outcome. 
In the meantime, however, the medical profession has 
undergone drastic changes, and ethical debates remain 
inextricably linked with the legal questions raised by issues 
such as treatment refusal, abortion, assisted suicide, and the 
death penalty. The ethical integrity of the medical profession 
needs to be safeguarded, and the Saikewicz state-interest test is 
not going to do it. 
It is time for courts to think about the effect of their decisions 
on the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Courts 
making these determinations should use authorities other than 
just the medical establishment itself. Legislatures should foster 
dialogue on medical ethics that is not limited to doctors, and 
that provides courts with a clearer picture of what ethical 
requirements society has for its doctors. Courts should then 
apply these ethical standards, rather than defining their own. 
The courts must also recognize that the ethical integrity of the 
medical profession requires some ethical autonomy for medical 
practitioners. Finally, courts should seek to maximize the sum 
of these interests-patients', doctors', and society's-rather 
than respecting only the one perceived to be weightiest in the 
case at hand. It is time to take the maintenance of the ethical 
integrity of the medical profession seriously. 
